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Abstract	
In	the	light	of	the	unprecedented	growth	of	mobile	broadband	services,	radio	spectrum	regulation	is	undergoing	
a	substantial	review	in	the	European	Union	(EU).	The	radio	spectrum	presents	a	three-level	regulatory	context.	
At	 international	 level,	 the	 International	 Telecommunications	 Union	 (ITU)	 regulates	 the	 allocation	 of	 radio	
spectrum.	At	regional	level,	the	European	Conference	of	Postal	and	Telecommunications	Administrations	(CEPT)	
promotes	 cooperation	 and	 coordination	 between	 European	 countries.	 At	 national	 level,	 National	 Regulatory	
Authorities	(NRAs)	are	responsible	for	assigning	the	radio	spectrum.	In	addition,	the	EU	has	also	the	power	to	
regulate	 the	radio	spectrum.	The	EU	regulatory	 framework	 for	 radio	spectrum	has	only	 recently	been	set	up.	
Therefore,	 an	 exhaustive	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 three-level	 regulatory	 context	 of	 radio	
spectrum	is	still	lacking.	
Against	 this	 background,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 EU	 regulatory	
framework	for	radio	spectrum.	In	other	words,	this	thesis	aims	to	address	the	following	research	question:	how	
does	 the	 EU	 influence	 the	 three-level	 regulatory	 context	 of	 radio	 spectrum?	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 this	 research	
question,	three	academic	papers	are	written,	each	focusing	on	the	role	of	the	EU	in	one	regulatory	level.	Paper	1	
focuses	on	the	international	level.	Theories	of	international	relations	are	employed	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	
the	EU	in	influencing	international	negotiations	on	radio	spectrum	regulation.	Paper	2	explores	the	regional	level.	
Theories	of	EU	integration	provide	the	tools	to	understand	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	
EU	member	states	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	Paper	3	deals	with	the	national	level.	Theories	on	the	
regulation-innovation	 relation	 guide	 the	 assessment	of	 a	 specific	 national	 regulatory	 regime,	which	has	been	
particularly	promoted	by	the	EU.	Although	radio	spectrum	assignment	 is	a	national	responsibility,	the	EU	may	
indirectly	 impact	on	 the	national	 context	by	providing	EU	member	 states	with	 ideas	on	 innovative	 regulatory	
tools.	
A	qualitative	research	strategy	is	adopted	to	conduct	the	research	work	described	in	this	thesis.	In	particular,	this	
research	work	is	characterised	by	an	iterative	inductive-deductive	process	between	theory	and	empirical	data,	
whereby	purpose,	theoretical	framework	and	data	collected	progressively	and	mutually	shape	one	another.	This	
thesis	 is	mainly	based	on	secondary	data,	 retrieved	 from	official	documents,	 reports,	news	articles,	academic	
papers	 and	 books.	 Backward	 and	 forward	 snowballing	 techniques	 are	 used	 to	 systematically	 find	 relevant	
secondary	sources	of	data.	
	
	 	
	
	
 
	
II	
This	thesis	concludes	that	the	EU	regulatory	framework	influences	the	three	regulatory	levels	of	radio	spectrum	
to	different	extents.	 Firstly,	 the	EU	 influences	 the	 international	 level	 thanks	 to	 the	presence	of	 the	European	
Commission	(EC)	in	international	fora.	The	EC	has	the	right	to	attend	international	negotiations	on	radio	spectrum	
regulation	and	can	oversee	the	actions	of	EU	member	states.	Secondly,	the	EU	impacts	on	the	regional	level	by	
promoting	 harmonised	 availability	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 across	 the	 EU.	 To	 this	 objective,	 the	 EU	 adopts	 policy	
instruments	which	are	legally	binding	for	all	EU	member	states.	Furthermore,	the	EC	cooperates	with	the	CEPT	in	
order	to	build	consensus	across	the	EU.	Thirdly,	the	EU’s	influence	on	the	national	regulatory	level	is	confined	to	
general	regulatory	principles	for	radio	spectrum	assignment.	Nevertheless,	the	EU	can	still	leverage	on	national	
regulation,	by	encouraging	EU	member	states	to	adopt	specific	regulatory	instruments.	
Although	interesting	implications	of	the	EU	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum	are	ascertained	in	this	thesis,	
the	influence	of	the	EU	on	the	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum	has	not	been	captured	thoroughly.	
Future	research	in	the	form	of	a	more	systematic	evaluation	of	the	EU’s	actorness	(Bretherton	&	Vogler,	2006)	is	
necessary	to	capture	the	relevance	of	the	EU’s	influence	on	both	the	international	and	regional	regulatory	levels.	
In	addition,	a	detailed	analysis	of	 the	 issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	 is	
critical	for	better	evaluating	the	extent	to	which	the	EU	influences	radio	spectrum	regulation	at	national	level.	
	
Keywords:	radio	spectrum	regulation;	European	Union;	shared	competence;	allocation;	assignment.	 	
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1	
Radio	spectrum	regulation	in	the	European	Union	
A	three-level	context	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 cover	 essay	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 research	 work	 conducted	 and	
document	the	coherence	of	 this	 thesis.	The	cover	essay	 is	structured	 in	six	sections.	Section	1	 introduces	the	
research	problem	addressed	in	the	thesis.	Furthermore,	purpose	and	research	questions	are	outlined,	as	well	as	
the	scope	of	the	thesis	and	its	limitations.	Section	2	gives	a	thorough	presentation	of	the	theoretical	framework	
used	 to	 understand	 and	 analyse	 the	 research	 problem.	 Section	 3	 presents	 the	 research	 strategy	 adopted	 to	
conduct	the	research	work.	Section	4	provides	a	summary	of	the	appended	papers,	outlining	the	theoretical	and	
practical	contribution	of	each	paper	to	the	overall	purpose.	In	section	5,	comprehensive	analysis	and	discussion	
of	the	research	problem	are	provided,	based	on	the	three	appended	papers.	Finally,	section	6	concludes	with	
final	remarks	on	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	existing	knowledge	and	provides	recommendations	for	future	
research.		
1.	Introduction	
After	a	brief	description	of	the	expected	reader	of	this	thesis,	this	section	introduces	the	reader	to	the	research	
problem.	 Firstly,	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	 research	 context	 is	 provided.	 Secondly,	 purpose	 and	 research	
questions	of	the	research	work	are	outlined.	Thirdly,	the	scope	and	limitations	of	the	thesis	are	pointed	out.	
	
1.1.	The	expected	reader	
This	 thesis	 is	multidisciplinary	 and	 international	 in	 scope.	 It	 is	 intended	 to	 serve	 a	 readership	of	 researchers,	
industry	practitioners	and	policy	makers	 involved	 in	radio	spectrum	policy	 issues,	with	an	 interest	 in	gaining	a	
deep	 understanding	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU).	 This	 thesis	 addresses	 radio	
spectrum	policy	issues	from	a	EU	political	science	perspective.	Although	the	emphasis	is	on	radio	spectrum	policy,	
this	thesis	might	provide	useful	insights	for	a	wider	variety	of	readers,	who	are	curious	about	the	EU	integration	
process,	the	EU	policy-making	methods	and	the	role	of	the	EU	as	an	international	actor.	
	
1.2.	Contextual	background	
Novel	uses	of	radio	spectrum	have	uncovered	an	urgent	need	to	review	and	revise	the	existing	radio	spectrum	
regulatory	framework.	Currently,	the	radio	spectrum	is	in	the	limelight	of	policy	makers	and	industry	practitioners	
involved	in	the	global	race	for	the	provision	of	5th	generation	(5G)	mobile	broadband	services.1	5G	is	expected	to	
bring	enormous	economic	and	social	benefits	worldwide,	supporting	the	digitalisation	of	a	number	of	industries	
such	as:	transport,	health,	manufacturing,	logistics,	energy,	media	and	entertainment.	Key	players	from	different	
industries	 are	 actively	 engaged	 in	 discussions	with	 policy	makers	 and	 regulators	 about	 creating	 a	 regulatory	
																																																																		
	
1	The	acronym	5G	is	used	to	indicate	the	fifth	generation	of	both	mobile	services	and	mobile	networks.	Furthermore,	mobile	services	and	networks	are	
indicated	with	different	expressions	in	various	official	and	unofficial	documents.	For	instance,	mobile	services	are	also	referred	to	as	mobile	broadband	
services,	 mobile	 communications	 services	 or	 wireless	 communications	 services.	 Similarly,	 mobile	 networks	 are	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 mobile	 network	
technology,	mobile	communications	 technology	or	wireless	communications	 technology.	These	 terms	do	not	have	 the	exact	 same	meaning.	However,	
investigating	the	difference	in	meaning	between	the	terms	is	considered	not	to	be	relevant	for	this	thesis.	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
2	
environment	which	would	 encourage	 investment	 and	 innovation	 in	mobile	 communications	 (ITU,	 2015a;	 5G	
manifesto,	2016;	COM(2016)	588;	FCC,	2016).	
The	existing	radio	spectrum	regulatory	framework	oversees	the	use	of	the	radio	spectrum	by	regulating	two	major	
activities:	allocation	and	assignment	of	radio	spectrum.	Radio	spectrum	allocation	is	carried	out	at	international	
level,	while	radio	spectrum	assignment	is	a	national	responsibility.	A	frequency	band	is	allocated	when	a	decision	
is	taken	on	the	service(s)	that	can	be	provided	by	using	that	specific	frequency	band.	Each	frequency	band	and	its	
related	 service(s)	 are	 indicated	 in	 the	 international	 Table	 of	 Frequency	 Allocations	 (TFA),	 which	 reports	 all	
frequency	 bands	 and	 attached	 services,	 on	 a	 global	 basis	 (ITU,	 2012a).	Once	 allocated	 at	 international	 level,	
frequency	bands	are	assigned	at	national	level.	A	frequency	band	is	assigned	when	service	providers	are	granted	
authorisations	to	deliver	their	services	over	that	frequency	band,	on	a	national	basis	(ITU,	2012a).	As	shown	in	
Table	 1,	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	 at	 international	 level	 is	 a	 core	 responsibility	 of	 the	 International	
Telecommunication	Union	(ITU).	The	ITU	is	responsible	for	allocating	radio	spectrum	frequency	bands	to	radio-
based	services,	which	are	set	out	in	the	TFA.	National	regulatory	authorities	(NRAs)	are	in	charge	of	regulating	
the	radio	spectrum	at	national	level.	NRAs	conducts	assignment	procedures	for	granting	radio	spectrum	licences	
to	service	providers	within	their	national	territories.	Radio	spectrum	is	largely	regulated	at	national	level,	the	radio	
spectrum	being	a	national	resource	(Cave	&	Webb,	2015).	
Table	1.	Radio	spectrum:	international	and	national	regulatory	levels	
Regulatory	Context	 Radio	Spectrum	Activity	 Entity	
International	 Allocation	 Designating	frequency	bands	to	radio-based	services	 ITU	
National	 Assignment	 Granting	service	providers	authorisations	for	using	the	frequency	bands	 NRAs	
	
1.2.1.	Radio	spectrum	allocation	
At	international	level,	the	radio	spectrum	is	regulated	by	the	ITU,	a	specialised	agency	of	the	United	Nations	(UN).2	
Every	three	to	four	years,	the	ITU	holds	a	World	Radiocommunication	Conference	(WRC),	where	ITU	member	
states	discuss	and	revise	the	so-called	Radio	Regulations	(RR).	The	RR	is	the	international	treaty	that	regulates	the	
allocation	of	radio	spectrum	frequency	bands	to	the	various	radio-based	services,	with	binding	effects	on	all	ITU	
member	 states.	 The	 ITU	 counts	 193	member	 states,	 including	 all	 EU	member	 states.	Delegations	 of	 national	
governments	 participate	 in	WRCs	 and	 take	 decisions	 in	 the	 matter	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 allocation.	 Each	WRC	
concludes	with	the	adoption	of	amendments	to	specific	portions	of	the	RR.	
In	the	RR,	the	globe	is	conventionally	divided	into	three	macro-regions,	called	ITU	Region	1,	Region	2	and	Region	
3.	As	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	Region	1	includes	Europe,	Africa,	the	Middle	East,	including	Iraq,	the	former	Soviet	
Union	and	Mongolia.	Region	2	covers	the	Americas,	Greenland	and	some	of	the	eastern	Pacific	Islands;	and	Region	
3	 comprises	most	of	 the	Asian	 countries,	which	were	not	part	of	 the	 former	Soviet	Union,	 Iran,	 and	most	of	
Oceania	(Cave	&	Webb,	2015).	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																		
	
2	Descriptive	information	contained	in	this	section	is	retrieved	from	the	websites	of	the	ITU	and	the	CEPT.	This	information	is	publicly	available.	
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Figure	1.	ITU	Regions	
Source:	ITU	(2012),	Radio	Regulations,	Vol.	1	Art.	5.	
Cross-border	coordination	of	the	use	of	radio	spectrum	is	fundamental	 in	order	to	avoid	the	risk	of	producing	
harmful	 interference.	 In	 this	 respect,	 countries	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 ITU	 Region	 have	 established	 regional3	
organisations	to	create	a	forum	for	discussion	and	strengthen	cooperation.	In	particular,	countries	in	Region	1	
are	 organised	 in	 four	 regional	 entities:	 the	 European	 Conference	 of	 Postal	 and	 Telecommunications	
Administrations	(CEPT),	the	African	Telecommunications	Union	(ATU),	the	Arab	Spectrum	Management	Group	
(ASMG),	and	the	Regional	Commonwealth	 in	the	Field	of	Communications	(RCC).	Countries	 in	Region	2	are	all	
members	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Telecommunication	 Commission	 (CITEL).	 Likewise,	 all	 countries	 in	 Region	 3	
belong	to	the	Asia-Pacific	Telecommunity	(APT).	
With	 the	 establishment	 of	 such	 regional	 organisations,	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	 acquires	 a	 three-level	
regulatory	context,	adding	a	regional	 level	 to	the	existing	 international	and	national	 regulatory	 levels.	Table	2	
gives	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 three-level	 regulatory	 context	 of	 radio	 spectrum.	 The	 overall	 aim	 of	 regional	
organisations	is	to	harmonise	radio	spectrum	regulation	and	promote	coordination	of	radio	spectrum,	regionally.	
In	particular,	regional	organisations	are	responsible	for	building	consensus	among	countries	on	common	policy	
objectives	and	associated	priorities	with	 regard	 to	 radio	 spectrum	allocation.	On	behalf	of	 the	countries	 they	
represent,	each	regional	organisation	is	responsible	for	formulating	regional	proposals	to	review	the	RR	during	
the	preparatory	work	of	WRCs.4	Such	regional	proposals	express	the	common	view	of	the	countries	belonging	to	
the	same	region	on	the	topics	that	are	discussed	at	WRCs.	
	 	
																																																																		
	
3	The	term	“region”	indicates	a	geographical	area	which	includes	a	group	of	countries.	The	term	“Region”	refers	to	the	three	agglomerates	of	countries	
called	ITU	Region	1,	Region	2	and	Region	3,	as	specified	in	the	RR.	
4	Belonging	to	a	regional	organisation	does	not	prevent	ITU	member	states	from	formulating	individual	proposals	for	modification	of	the	RR.	
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Table	2.	Radio	spectrum:	three-level	regulatory	context	
Regulatory	Context	 Radio	Spectrum	Activity	 Entity	
International	 Allocation		 Designating	frequency	bands	to	radio-based	services	 ITU	
Regional	 Allocation	 Formulating	common	proposals	to	review	radio	spectrum	allocations	
CEPT;	ATU;	ASMG;	
RCC;	CITE;	APT	
National	 Assignment	
Granting	service	providers	authorisations	for	using	the	frequency	
bands		
NRAs	
The	EU	member	states	are	members	of	the	regional	organisation	called	CEPT,	which	brings	together	48	European	
countries,5	 corresponding	 to	 almost	 the	 entire	 geographical	 area	 of	 Europe.	 Within	 the	 CEPT,	 a	 specialised	
Conference	Preparatory	Group	(CPG)	is	set	up	with	the	responsibility	to	prepare	the	so-called	European	Common	
proposals	(ECPs)	for	WRCs.	ECPs	contain	common	proposals	for	amendments	to	the	RR.	They	are	adopted	with	
the	 support	 of	 ten	 CEPT	 members	 and	 the	 opposition	 of	 not	 more	 than	 six	 CEPT	 members.	 ECPs	 are	 then	
discussed	at	WRCs,	together	with	other	proposals	for	modification	of	the	RR.	
1.2.2.	Radio	spectrum	assignment	
NRAs	grant	service	providers	access	to	the	radio	spectrum	on	a	national	level.	NRAs	can	be	an	independent	agency	
or	part	of	a	government	ministry.	A	statute	usually	specifies	NRAs’	powers	and	responsibilities.	In	some	countries,	
radio	spectrum	is	a	shared	responsibility	between	a	government	ministry	and	an	NRA	(Cave	&	Webb,	2015).	NRAs	
assign	 radio	 spectrum	 rights	 of	 use	 by	 means	 of	 assignment	 procedures.	 Assignment	 procedures	 can	 be	
administrative-based,	whereby	radio	spectrum	rights	of	use	are	usually	assigned	free	of	charge,	on	a	first	come-
first	 served	 basis,	 or	 by	 beauty	 contests	 (e.g.	 Melody	 &	 Lemstra,	 2011).	 Beauty	 contests	 are	 comparative	
administrative	procedures,	whereby	competing	applications	are	assessed	and	winning	applicants	are	selected	on	
the	basis	of	a	 set	of	predefined	criteria,	 including	 financial	 resources	and	network	deployment	plans	 (Cave	&	
Webb,	 2015).	 Currently,	market-based	assignment	procedures	are	 generally	 adopted	 in	 the	EU.	 In	particular,	
radio	spectrum	rights	of	use	are	assigned	by	means	of	auctions.	In	an	auction,	licences	are	awarded	on	the	basis	
of	bidding	among	competing	applicants.	Generally,	the	bidder	who	offers	the	highest	monetary	sum	is	granted	a	
licence	to	use	the	spectrum	(ITU,	2012b).	Markets	for	radio	spectrum	rights	of	use	have	also	been	established,	to	
allow	for	a	change	of	ownership	by	secondary	trading	(McLean	Foster	&	Co.,	2007).	Furthermore,	access	to	certain	
portion	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 can	 be	 granted	 on	 a	 licence-exempt	 basis.	 In	 licence-exempt	 frequency	 bands,	
spectrum	users	can	provide	services	without	holding	a	licence.	However,	they	are	asked	to	comply	with	specific	
technical	requirements	so	that	the	provision	of	their	services	is	not	likely	to	cause	any	harmful	interference	to	
other	radio	spectrum	users	in	the	same	or	adjacent	bands.	Since	radio	spectrum	users	do	not	acquire	a	licence,	
they	are	not	entitled	any	protection	from	potential	harmful	interference	caused	by	other	radio	spectrum	users	
(Faulhaber	&	Farber,	2002).	
1.2.3.	Radio	spectrum	allocation	and	assignment:	the	European	Union	
The	EU’s	interest	in	radio	spectrum	regulation	is	grounded	in	the	EU’s	policy	priority	of	creating	the	so-called	EU	
internal	market	(EC,	2014).	The	EU	internal	market	is	conceptualised	as	a	unified	market	with	minimum	national	
regulatory	barriers,	where	capital,	persons,	goods	and	services	can	easily	circulate	across	the	EU.	Both	European	
and	national	policy-makers,	and	industry	practitioners	have	acknowledged	the	desirability	of	establishing	the	EU	
																																																																		
	
5	 Current	members	of	 the	CEPT	 are:	Albania,	Andorra,	Austria,	 Azerbaijan,	 Belarus,	 Belgium,	Bosnia	 and	Herzegovina,	 Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	 Cyprus,	 Czech	
Republic,	Denmark,	Estonia,	Finland,	France,	Georgia,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Italy,	Latvia,	Liechtenstein,	Lithuania,	Luxembourg,	The	
former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia,	Malta,	Moldova,	Monaco,	Montenegro,	Netherlands,	Norway,	Poland,	Portugal,	Romania,	Russian	Federation,	San	
Marino,	Serbia,	Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	Spain,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	Turkey,	Ukraine,	United	Kingdom	and	Vatican.	This	information	is	publicly	available	
on	the	CEPT	website.	
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internal	market,	given	the	increasingly	interdependent	nature	of	national	economies	(Nugent,	2010).	Recently,	
the	European	Commission	(EC)	has	formulated	a	Digital	Single	Market	(DSM)	strategy	(COM(2015)	192)	for	the	
removal	of	national	regulatory	barriers,	which	would	prevent	the	EU	from	seizing	the	opportunities	offered	by	
digitalisation.	In	this	context,	the	EC	claims	that	the	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum	currently	in	place	
in	the	EU	slows	down	the	creation	of	the	EU	DSM	because	it	does	not	ensure	coordinated	availability	of	radio	
spectrum	across	EU	member	states,	which	is	necessary	for	the	development	of	trans-European	networks	and	the	
provision	of	pan-European	services	(SWD(2016)	313).	Coordinated	availability	of	radio	spectrum	would	require	
both	 harmonised	 allocation	 of	 frequency	 bands,	 including	 technical	 measures	 to	 limit	 the	 risk	 of	 harmful	
interference,	 as	 well	 as	 coordinated	 national	 assignment	 procedures	 and	 harmonised	 conditions	 of	 use,	 for	
instance	in	terms	of	licence	duration	and	coverage	requirements.	In	this	way,	radio	frequency	bands	would	be	
available	at	the	same	conditions	in	all	EU	member	states.	According	to	the	EC,	lack	of	coordination	across	the	EU	
has	 discouraged	 investment	 and	 innovation	 in	 advanced	 networks	 and	 services	 (COM(2013)	 627),	 to	 the	
detriment	of	the	EU	DSM	(EC,	2016a;	Ansip,	2016).	
The	EC	is	the	major	EU	institution	responsible	for	promoting	harmonisation	of	radio	spectrum	use	across	the	EU.	
To	perform	its	duty,	the	EC	is	supported	by	two	EU	bodies:	the	Radio	Spectrum	Policy	Group	(RSPG)	and	the	Radio	
Spectrum	 Committee	 (RSC).	 RSPG	 is	 a	 consultative	 group,	 whose	 members	 are	 high-level	 governmental	
representatives	of	the	EU	member	states	and	an	official	representative	of	the	EC.	Similarly,	the	RSC	is	composed	
of	 representatives	 of	 the	 EU	 member	 states	 and	 it	 is	 chaired	 by	 an	 official	 representative	 of	 the	 EC.	 This	
comitology	mechanism	was	introduced	by	the	2002	Radio	Spectrum	Decision	of	the	European	Parliament	(EP)	
and	the	Council	of	the	EU	(Council)	with	the	aim	to	lay	down	the	foundation	of	the	EU	legislative	framework6	for	
radio	 spectrum	 to	 promote	 harmonised	 used	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 across	 the	 EU	 and	 further	 EU	 interests	 at	
international	 level.	 In	particular,	RSPG	assists	 the	EC	 in	 the	 formulation	of	strategic	actions,	 taking	account	of	
economic,	political,	social	and	other	relevant	aspects	of	radio	spectrum	use.	Furthermore,	the	RSC	supports	the	
EC	 in	 formulating,	 developing	 and	 implementing	 technical	 measures	 necessary	 for	 ensuring	 coordinated	
availability	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 across	 the	 EU	 (Decision	 676/2002/EC;	 Decision	 2002/622/EC;	 Decision	
2009/978/EU).	
The	policy	area	of	 radio	spectrum	 is	an	area	of	shared	competence	between	EU	and	EU	member	states.	This	
means	that	both	EU	and	national	institutions	can	legislate.	For	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	competence	is	intended	
as	the	power	to	legislate.	The	distribution	of	competence	between	EU	and	national	institutions	is	regulated	by	
the	 Treaty	 on	 EU	 (TEU)	 and	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 EU	 (TFEU).	 These	 treaties	 are	 binding	
international	agreements,	whereby	EU	member	states	have	agreed	on	conferring	EU	institutions	the	power	to	
act,	 to	different	extents,	 in	various	policy	areas.	Although	both	EU	and	EU	member	states	can	 legislate	 in	the	
policy	field	of	radio	spectrum,	only	EU	member	states	can	decide	how	the	radio	spectrum	is	to	be	allocated.	The	
EU	does	not	have	the	right	to	participate	in	the	WRC	decision-making	process.	Nevertheless,	it	is	granted	the	right	
to	attend	WRCs	as	observer	and	it	is	involved,	in	various	ways,	in	the	preparatory	work	prior	to	WRCs.	
The	 EU’s	 membership	 in	 international	 organisations	 assumes	 different	 degrees	 of	 engagement,	 from	 pure	
observer	to	full	member.	Being	an	observer	means	that	the	EU	can	attend	meetings	of	international	institutions,	
but	does	not	have	the	right	to	vote.	On	the	contrary,	when	the	EU	has	full	membership,	it	actively	participates	in	
the	decision-making	processes.	Wessel	(2011)	states	that	the	degree	of	engagement	of	the	EU	in	an	international	
organisation	 depends	 on	 two	 factors:	 firstly,	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 international	 organisation	 itself,	 which	 might	
recognise	full	membership	only	to	nation	states,	and,	secondly,	the	distribution	of	competences	between	EU	and		
																																																																		
	
6	The	terms	EU	legislative	framework	and	EU	regulatory	frameworks	are	used	interchangeably	in	this	thesis	to	indicate	the	rules	set	by	the	EU	to	control	the	
use	of	the	radio	spectrum	in	the	EU.	
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EU	member	states,	namely,	the	EU	member	states’	willingness	to	transfer	national	sovereignty	to	the	EU.	The	EU	
usually	has	full	membership	in	international	organisations	engaged	in	policy	areas	where	it	retains	exclusive	or	
extensive	 competences,	 such	 as	 trade,	 fisheries	 and	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 internal	 market.	 In	 addition,	 the	
willingness	of	the	EU	to	engage	in	international	negotiations	also	depends	on	whether	the	global	issues	at	stake	
occupy	a	relevant	position	in	the	EU’s	agenda.	In	this	regard,	radio	spectrum	use	has	become	one	of	the	main	
policy	priorities	of	the	EU,	for	the	creation	of	the	EU	DSM	(COM(2015)	192;	Ansip,	2016).	It	is	worth	mentioning	
that	the	role	of	the	EU	in	international	organisations	has	been,	for	long	time,	neglected	by	international	relations	
literature,	 because	 of	 the	 belief	 that	 external	 relations	 activity	 was	mainly	 a	 nation	 state	 responsibility	 (e.g.	
Bretherton	 &	 Vogler,	 2006).	 Furthermore,	 other	 dominant	 players	 in	 world	 politics	 have	 been	 struggling	 to	
recognise	 and	 accept	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 international	 entity,	 because	 of	 little	 understanding	 of	 its	 multi-level	
governance	structure	(e.g.	Waele	&	Kuipers,	2013:	4).	With	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2009	(EU,	
2007),	the	EU	has	strengthened	its	role	as	global	actor,	often	acting	as	promoter	and	main	supporter	of	trade	
negotiations,	military	interventions,	democracy,	international	development,	climate	change	debates,	and	reforms	
of	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (e.g.	Waele	&	Kuipers,	 2013).	 The	EU’s	 increasing	participation	 in	 global	
politics	has	generated	a	growing	interest,	 in	the	academic	world,	to	research	about	the	EU	as	an	international	
actor	(e.g.	Wunderlich	&	Bailey,	2011;	Jørgensen	et	al.,	2011).	In	particular,	the	EU	role	has	been	investigated	in	
various	international	organisations,	such	as	the	UN	(Brantner	&	Gowan,	2009;	Buonanno	&	Nugent,	2013);	the	
North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(Menon,	2011;	Simon,	2012;	Varwick	&	Koops,	2009;	Buonanno	&	Nugent,	
2013);	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(Smaghi,	2009);	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Groenleer	&	Schaik,	
2007);	and	the	World	Trade	Organization	(Gehring	et	al.,	2013).	Continuing	this	tradition,	this	thesis	looks	at	the	
EU	as	an	actor	in	its	own	right,	participating	in	international	negotiations	for	radio	spectrum	regulation,	within	
the	ITU	framework.	
With	regard	to	the	relation	between	EU	and	national	institutions,	competence	distribution	has	been	a	hot	topic	
in	European	studies	since	the	beginning	of	the	EU	integration	process	(Rosamond,	2000;	Pollack,	2000;	Henkel,	
2002;	Henke,	2006;	Heidbreder,	2014).	Many	theories	of	European	integration	have	been	developed	over	time.	
These	theories	examine	the	EU	integration	process	trying	to	understand	formation	and	functioning	of	the	EU,	as	
well	 as	 to	 foresee	 its	 future	 developments	 (Rosamond,	 2000).	 Particular	 attention	 has	 been	 devoted	 to	
scrutinising	the	exercise	of	legislative	power	by	the	EU	institutions	in	policy	areas	of	shared	competence,	such	as	
financial	 services	 and	 capital	 markets	 (Pelkmans,	 2005;	 Dixon,	 2014),	 labour	 markets	 (Pelkmans,	 2006),	
agriculture	 (Grether,	2008),	and	environment	 (Kulovesi	et	al.,	2011).	The	general	aim	 is	 to	provide	motives	 in	
support	of	centralisation	of	legislative	power	to	EU	institutions	or	decentralisation	of	legislative	power	towards	
national	or	 sub-national	 institutions.	Currently,	 the	distribution	of	competences	between	EU	and	EU	member	
states	has	become	an	issue	of	enormous	relevance	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	Demand	for	access	to	
the	radio	spectrum	is	constantly	and	rapidly	growing,	in	particular	due	to	the	pervasive	use	of	mobile	broadband	
services.	
The	need	to	find	additional	spectrum	for	mobile	broadband	services	is	putting	pressure	on	existing	radio	spectrum	
regulation.	In	the	EU,	increasing	attention	is	devoted	to	alternative	ways	to	allocate	and	assign	radio	spectrum	in	
order	to	accommodate	emerging	spectrum	needs,	 including	new	forms	of	radio	spectrum	sharing,	which	may	
play	a	key	role	for	the	provision	of	5G	(e.g.	COM(2012)	478;	Mueck	et	al.,	2015;	AGCOM,	2016).	In	particular,	the	
EU	promotes	two	alternative	sharing	regimes:	the	licence-exempt	approach,	also	known	as	the	Collective	Use	of	
Spectrum	(CUS)	approach,	and	the	Licence	Shared	Access	(LSA)	approach.	The	main	difference	between	these	
two	approaches	 regards	 the	 type	of	 authorisation	granted	 to	 service	providers.	 In	 the	CUS	approach,	 service	
providers	do	not	hold	individual	licences,	but	they	are	granted	a	general	authorisation	to	access	the	spectrum.	
No	protection	from	interference	 is	guaranteed	to	spectrum	users,	which	are	asked	to	adopt	specific	technical	
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measures	in	order	to	minimise	the	risk	of	producing	harmful	interference.	In	the	LSA	approach,	service	providers	
hold	individual	licences	to	access	certain	frequency	bands	on	a	shared	basis.	The	LSA	approach	has	only	recently	
been	introduced	in	the	EU	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum	and	its	regulatory	architecture	is	still	being	
discussed	 by	 policy-makers	 (e.g.	 RSPG,	 2013);	 industry	 practitioners	 (e.g.	 GSMA,	 2013)	 and	 researchers	 (e.g.	
Palola,	et	al,	2014).	Nevertheless,	LSA	testing	has	been	conducted	in	a	number	of	EU	member	states,	including	
Italy,	Spain,	Finland	and	France	(COM(2012),	478;	ETSI,	2013;	CEPT,	2014a	&	2014b).	
In	September	2016,	the	EC	launched	a	new	EU	legislative	proposal,	which	would	significantly	reform	the	existing	
EU	legislative	framework	for	radio	spectrum,	substantially	altering	the	distribution	of	competences	between	EU	
and	EU	member	states,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	radio	spectrum	assignment	 (COM(2016)	590).	This	 recent	
legislative	 proposal	 has	 triggered	 intensive	 discussions	 on	 the	 degree	 of	 involvement	 of	 EU	 and	 national	
institutions	in	radio	spectrum	policy.	Although	both	EU	and	EU	member	states	have	recognised	that	the	existing	
framework	 is	 to	 be	 revised	 (e.g.	 COM(2013)	 627;	 ComReg,	 2016),	 there	 is	 large	 disagreement	 on	 how	
competences	 should	 be	 distributed	 between	 EU	 and	 national	 institutions.	 The	 EC	 claims	 that	 the	 existing	
framework	does	not	ensure	coordinated	availability	of	radio	spectrum	across	the	EU,	which	is	needed	for	the	EU	
to	be	successful	in	the	5G	race	(5G	manifesto,	2016;	COM(2016)	588).	Therefore,	the	EC	proposes	to	adopt	EU-
wide	 regulatory	 criteria	 to	 guarantee	 higher	 harmonisation	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 allocation	 and	 radio	 spectrum	
assignment	 procedures.	 The	 EU	 legislative	 framework	 for	 radio	 spectrum	 has	 only	 recently	 been	 set	 up.	
Therefore,	 an	 exhaustive	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 three-level	 regulatory	 context	 of	 radio	
spectrum	is	still	lacking.	
	
1.3.	Purpose	and	research	questions	
The	purpose	of	the	study	is	to	shed	light	on	the	implications	of	the	EU	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum.	
In	other	words,	this	thesis	aims	to	address	the	following	research	question:	
How	does	the	EU	influence	the	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum?	
In	order	to	address	this	question,	three	sub-questions	are	devised,	each	focusing	on	one	regulatory	level.	
Sub-question	1.	To	what	extent	has	the	EU	been	effective	in	influencing	WRCs’	outcomes?	
Sub-question	1	focuses	on	the	international	regulatory	context.	Paper	1	answers	sub-question	1	by	providing	an	
assessment	of	the	EU	effectiveness	in	influencing	the	outcomes	of	three	WRCs.	EU	effectiveness	is	intended	as	
the	ability	of	the	EU	to	achieve	its	objectives	in	specific	multilateral	settings	(Jørgensen	et	al.,	2011;	Wessel,	2011;	
Schaik,	2013).	In	order	to	assess	EU	effectiveness,	a	comparison	is	made	between	EU’s	objectives	prior	to	WRCs	
and	WRCs’	outcomes.	The	degree	of	match	between	EU’s	objectives	and	WRCs’	outcomes	is	taken	as	explanatory	
of	the	EU’s	capability	to	fulfil	its	objectives	through	international	negotiations.	
Sub-question	2.	How	has	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	changed	overtime	in	the	
policy	field	of	radio	spectrum?	
Sub-question	2	focuses	on	the	regional	regulatory	context.	Paper	2	answers	sub-question	2	by	tracing	changes	of	
competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	since	the	beginning	of	EU	radio	spectrum	policy,	
eventually	focusing	on	the	most	recent	EU	legislative	proposals.	Changes	of	competence	distribution	are	traced	
by	documenting	the	expansion	of	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation,	paying	particular	attention	to	the	type	of	legal	
instruments	adopted	by	the	EU.	Content	and	format	of	the	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation	delimits	the	competence	
of	the	EU	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
8	
Sub-question	 3.	 To	what	 extent	 has	 the	 EU	been	 successful	 in	 influencing	 EU	member	 states’	 radio	 spectrum	
regulatory	practices?		
Sub-question	3	focuses	on	the	national	regulatory	context.	Paper	3	answers	sub-question	3	by	examining	the	LSA	
regulatory	regime,	which	has	been	particularly	promoted	by	the	EU.	Although	radio	spectrum	assignment	 is	a	
national	exclusive	competence,	the	EU	may	indirectly	impact	on	the	national	regulatory	level	by	encouraging	the	
adoption	of	regulatory	instruments,	such	as	the	LSA,	by	the	EU	member	states.	
	
1.4.	Scope	and	limitations	of	the	thesis	
As	stated	by	Cave	&	Webb	(2015:	3):	“Life	without	the	services	reliant	upon	spectrum	would	be	unthinkable”.	In	
fact,	the	radio	spectrum	is	a	key	public	resource	for	an	extensive	range	of	commercial	and	public	services.	Public	
safety	and	emergency	 services,	defence,	public	broadcasting,	 and	public	 transport,	 are	all	 examples	of	public	
services	provided	over	the	radio	spectrum.	Private	television	broadcasting	and	mobile	broadband	services	are	
well-known	types	of	commercial	radio-based	services.	In	this	context,	the	scope	of	investigation	of	this	thesis	is	
narrowed	 to	 regulation	of	 the	commercial	use	of	 radio	 spectrum,	 in	particular	of	mobile	broadband	services,	
although	considerations	on	the	public	sector’s	use	of	radio	spectrum	are	sometimes	necessary.	Evidence	shows	
that	radio	spectrum	regulation	for	mobile	broadband	services	has	become	the	most	critical	regulatory	issue	of	
the	present	time,	due	to	an	exponential	growth	of	mobile	data	usage.	The	need	to	find	additional	radio	spectrum	
for	 mobile	 broadband	 services	 has	 triggered	 a	 profound	 review	 of	 existing	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 radio	
spectrum,	on	a	global	scale.	
Although	the	first	research	work	on	radio	spectrum	regulation	can	be	traced	back	to	1959,	when	the	seminal	
work	“The	Federal	Communication	Commission”	was	published	by	Ronald	Coase,	no	consistent	research	has	been	
developed,	 to	 investigate	 the	 three-level	 regulatory	 context	 of	 radio	 spectrum.	 Furthermore,	 although	
competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	has	been	a	hotly	debated	issue	in	European	studies,	
since	the	beginning	of	the	process	of	EU	integration,	no	research	study	has	investigated	this	issue	in	the	policy	
field	of	radio	spectrum.	Against	this	background,	this	thesis	can	be	considered	a	pioneering	work	for	two	main	
reasons.	Firstly,	it	delves	into	a	research	field,	that	of	radio	spectrum	regulation,	which	has	been	barely	explored	
in	political	science.	Secondly,	 it	 focuses	on	the	 issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	
states	in	a	policy	field	which	has	been	so	far	neglected	in	European	studies.	
Nevertheless,	 this	 thesis	 is	not	without	 limitations.	Three	major	 limitations	are	to	be	outlined.	Firstly,	a	single	
study	cannot	adequately	shed	light	on	a	phenomenon.	Further	research	is	needed	to	confirm,	reject	or	refine	the	
contribution	of	this	thesis.	Secondly,	this	study	does	not	strive	for	objectivity.	In	fact,	the	researcher’s	subjectivity	
is	part	of	the	research	investigation.	Although	aware	of	the	fact	that	existing	knowledge	and	expectations	may	
influence	the	research	process,	the	author	of	this	thesis	cannot	assure	that	her	judgement	has	been	free	from	
cognitive	biases	during	the	whole	research	process.	Thirdly,	data	used	in	this	study	may	represent	an	additional	
source	of	biases.	More	specifically,	most	of	the	data	have	been	collected	from	official	documents	published	by	
policy-makers	 and	 regulators.	 Enlarging	 the	 scope	of	 investigation,	 for	 instance	by	 including	 the	 viewpoint	of	
mobile	service	providers,	may	contribute	to	better	understand	the	EU	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum.	
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1.5.	Terminology	
The	purpose	of	this	sub-section	is	to	provide	the	reader	with	a	clear	explanation	of	the	relevant	terminology	used	
in	 the	 thesis.	Terms	often	 retain	different	meanings;	 therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	clearly	 state	how	terms	are	
connoted,	in	order	not	to	disorient	the	reader.	In	this	regard,	definitions	of	the	main	terms	recurrently	employed	
in	this	thesis,	both	in	the	cover	essay	and	the	appended	papers,	are	provided.	
Radio	 Spectrum.	 Radio	 spectrum	 is	 a	 term	 used	 to	 indicate	 a	 portion	 of	 the	 electromagnetic	 spectrum.	
Electromagnetic	 radiation	 can	be	described	 as	 a	 stream	of	massless	 particles,	 called	photons,	 each	 travelling	
through	space	in	a	wave-like	pattern	at	the	speed	of	light,	each	photon	carrying	a	certain	amount	of	energy	or	
information	(NASA,	2013).	The	electromagnetic	spectrum	is	conventionally	divided	into	categories,	on	the	basis	
of	propagation	properties,	such	as	frequency	and	wavelength,	and	amount	of	energy	carried.	As	shown	in	Figure	
2,	these	categories	are:	gamma	rays,	X	rays,	ultraviolet,	visible	light,	microwaves	and	radio	waves	(NASA,	2013).	
The	 radio	 spectrum	 is	 characterised	by	 radiation	with	 the	 lowest	 frequency,	 the	 longest	wavelength	 and	 the	
higher	amount	of	energy	
	
Figure	2.	The	electromagnetic	spectrum	
Source:	Nasa	(2013)	
The	 radio	 spectrum	 stands	 out	 from	 amongst	 natural	 resources	 because	 of	 its	 unique	 properties.	 The	 radio	
spectrum	is	not	homogeneous,	meaning	that	 it	owns	various	propagation	properties	and	information	carrying	
capacity,	which	result	valuable	for	the	provision	of	a	wide	variety	of	radio-based	services.	It	is	non-exhaustible,	
which	means	that	it	does	not	run	out	because	of	its	use,	but	it	is	non-storable,	thus	it	cannot	be	accumulated	for	
later	use.	The	radio	spectrum	cannot	be	created	or	destroyed.	Moreover,	radio	spectrum	is	considered	a	scarce	
resource:	 at	 a	 given	 time	 and	 location,	 it	 has	 limited	 availability.	 In	 fact,	 the	 radio	 spectrum	 is	 subject	 to	
congestion:	the	provision	of	services	using	the	same	or	adjoining	radio	frequency	bands,	at	the	same	time	and	in	
the	same	location,	might	cause	harmful	interference,	which	can	reduce	or	nullify	the	usability	of	radio	spectrum	
(Rosston	&	Steinberg,	1997;	Cave,	2002;	McLean	Foster	&	Co.,	2007;	COM(2010)	471).	The	need	to	manage	the	
problem	of	harmful	interference	is	at	the	very	foundation	of	radio	spectrum	regulation.	
In	the	RR,	the	radio	spectrum	is	divided	into	nine	frequency	bands,	as	shown	in	Table	3.	The	frequency	range	goes	
from	3	kHz	to	3000	GHz.	The	unit	for	frequency	is	the	hertz	(Hz);	as	a	matter	of	practicality,	multiple	of	Hz	are	
usually	used,	such	as	kilohertz	(1	kHz	=	103	Hz);	megahertz	(1	MHz	=	106	Hz);	gigahertz	(1Ghz	=	109	Hz).	Each	radio	
spectrum	frequency	band	is	allocated	to	specific	services.		
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Table	3.	Radio	spectrum:	nine	frequency	bands	
Band	Name	 Symbols	 Frequency	range	
Very	low	frequency	 VLF	 3	to	30	kHz	
Low	frequency	 LF	 30	to	300	kHz	
Medium	frequency	 MF	 300	to	3000	kHz	
High	frequency	 HF	 3	to	30	MHz	
Very	high	frequency	 VHF	 30	to	300	MHz	
Ultra	high	frequency	 UHF	 300	to	3000	MHz	
Super	high	frequency	 SHF	 3	to	30	GHz	
Extremely	high	frequency	 EHF	 30	to	300	GHz	
Terahertz	(ITU,	2015b)	 THz	 300	to	3000	GHz	
Source:	ITU	(2012),	Radio	Regulations	Article	2	
Allocation.	An	allocation	is	the	outcome	of	a	binding	decision	which	associates	a	frequency	band	to	one	or	more	
specific	services.	In	other	words,	a	frequency	band	is	allocated	when	a	decision	is	taken	on	the	service(s)	that	can	
be	provided	by	using	that	specific	frequency	band.	Each	frequency	band	and	its	related	service(s)	are	reported	in	
the	 international	 Table	 of	 Frequency	 Allocations	 (TFA),	 which	 summarises	 all	 frequency	 bands	 and	 related	
services,	worldwide	(ITU,	2012a).	Radio	spectrum	allocation	is	decided	at	international	level.	
Assignment.	An	assignment	is	the	outcome	of	a	binding	decision	which	associates	a	frequency	band,	allocated	to	
certain	services,	to	a	service	provider.	In	other	words,	a	frequency	band	is	assigned	when	service	providers	are	
granted	authorisations	to	deliver	their	services	over	that	frequency	band,	on	a	national	basis	(ITU,	2012).	
Authorisation.	 An	 authorisation	 is	 the	 approval	 that	 service	 providers	 receive	 from	NRAs	 to	 access	 a	 specific	
frequency	 band,	 for	 a	 certain	 period	 of	 time,	 in	 a	 certain	 geographical	 area.	 There	 exist	 different	 kinds	 of	
authorisation	(or	assignment)	procedures,	depending	on	whether	access	to	a	radio	frequency	band	is	exclusive	
or	shared	and	on	whether	the	authorisation	is	individual	or	general.	With	regard	to	the	commercial	use	of	radio	
spectrum,	service	providers	are	usually	granted	individual	authorisations,	also	referred	to	as	licences	or	rights	of	
use,	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Generally,	 such	 individual	 authorisations	 guarantee	 exclusive	 access	 to	 radio	 spectrum	
frequency	bands.	However,	new	modes	of	spectrum	sharing	would	allow	for	individual	authorisations	to	access	
certain	frequency	bands	on	a	shared	basis.	
European	Union.	The	EU	is	a	political	and	economic	system	formed	by	28	European	countries.	The	functioning	of	
the	EU	is	defined	in	the	Treaties	of	the	EU.	The	main	Treaties	currently	in	force	are:	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	
Rights	of	the	EU;	the	TEU	and	the	TFEU.	These	treaties	set	out	the	fundamental	principles	and	values	upon	which	
the	EU	is	based,	the	institutional	structure	of	the	EU	and	the	distribution	of	competences	between	EU	and	EU	
member	 states.	 The	 EU	 owns	 a	 sui	 generis	 institutional	 structure.	 In	 national	 systems,	 the	 distribution	 of	
legislative,	executive	and	judicial	powers	is	usually	based	on	the	Montesquieu’s	system	of	separation	of	powers,	
according	to	which	the	legislative	power	belongs	to	the	parliament,	the	executive	power	to	the	government	and	
the	 judiciary	 power	 to	 an	 independent	 court	 of	 justice.	 In	 the	 EU,	 there	 is	 no	 clear-cut	 separation	 of	 power	
between	the	EU	institutions.	
Institutions.	 The	 term	 institution	 is	 used	 in	 the	 thesis	 to	 refer	 to	 EU	 and	 national	 institutions.	 The	main	 EU	
institutions	mentioned	in	the	thesis	are	the	European	Commission,	the	European	Parliament,	and	the	Council	of	
the	European	Union.	National	institutions	are	national	regulatory	authorities	and	national	governments.	
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Policy.	The	term	policy	does	not	own	a	straightforward	definition.	In	the	remit	of	this	thesis,	policy	can	be	defined	
as	an	intended	course	of	action	to	reach	certain	goals	by	using	certain	identified	means	and	resources.	Policy-
making	can	be	defined	as	a	conscious	choice	between	alternative	policies.	
Legislation.	A	law	is	an	instrument	adopted	in	order	to	implement	a	policy.	At	EU	level,	a	law	is	the	outcome	of	
the	 EU	 decision-making	 process	 called	 Community	 method,	 which	 includes	 ordinary	 and	 special	 legislative	
procedures.	These	procedures	involve,	to	various	degrees,	the	EC,	the	EP	and	the	Council.	All	EU	member	states	
are	bound	by	EU	legislation.	In	addition,	each	EU	member	state	has	its	own	national	laws.	EU	laws	can	take	the	
form	regulations,	decisions	or	directives.	
Regulation.	In	the	context	of	the	EU	legislative	framework,	the	term	regulation	is	used	to	indicate	a	specific	type	
of	EU	law.	Regulations	are	directly	and	generally	applicable.	Regulations	 immediately	become	part	of	national	
legal	 systems,	without	 being	 transposed	 into	 national	 laws.	 Furthermore,	 they	 apply	 to	 any	 sort	 of	 situation	
objectively	determined	and	are	not	limited	to	specific	circumstances.	Regulations	are	usually	adopted	to	enhance	
legal	uniformity	across	the	EU.	
Decision.	In	the	context	of	the	EU	legislative	framework,	the	term	decision	is	used	to	indicate	a	specific	type	of	
EU	law.	Decisions	are	similar	to	regulations,	in	the	sense	that	decisions	are	also	directly	applicable.	However,	their	
content	is	usually	rather	specific.	Furthermore,	a	decision	can	be	addressed	not	only	to	EU	member	states,	but	
also	to	individuals	and	organisations.	Decisions	are	usually	adopted	to	enhance	legal	uniformity	across	the	EU.	
Directive.	In	the	context	of	the	EU	legislative	framework,	the	term	directive	is	used	to	indicate	a	specific	type	of	
EU	law.	Directives	are	not	directly	applicable.	Directives	can	apply	to	a	single,	a	group	or	all	EU	member	states.	
Contrary	to	regulations	and	decisions,	directives	need	to	be	transposed	into	national	legislation.	It	is	up	to	each	
EU	member	state	to	decide	what	type	of	domestic	 legal	 instrument	to	adopt	 in	order	to	reach	the	objectives	
specified	in	the	directive.	Directives	are	adopted	to	remove	conflicts	and	contradictions	between	national	legal	
systems	 in	order	 for	certain	conditions	 to	 take	place	 in	all	EU	member	states,	while	at	 the	same	time,	 taking	
account	of	national	legal	structures	(EU,	2012:	art.	288	TFEU;	Chalmers	et	al.,	2010;	EP,	2016;	EU,	2016b).	
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2.	Theoretical	Framework	
In	this	section,	the	reader	gets	familiar	with	the	theoretical	concepts	used	in	the	three	appended	papers	to	analyse	
the	research	problem	at	hand	and	contribute	to	its	understanding.	Firstly,	the	overall	theoretical	framework	for	
this	thesis	is	presented	in	a	comprehensive	manner,	emphasising	the	interdependencies	between	the	theories	
used.	Secondly,	the	relevant	theoretical	concepts,	drawn	from	these	theories,	are	illustrated	in	more	detail.	
	
2.1.	A	theoretical	overview	
This	 thesis	 is	 based	 on	 theories	 of	 international	 relations,	 theories	 of	 EU	 integration	 and	 theories	 on	 the	
regulation-innovation	 relation.	 At	 first	 glance,	 these	 theories	 might	 seem	 not	 to	 constitute	 a	 homogeneous	
theoretical	framework.	However,	theoretical	linkages	clearly	emerge	by	looking	more	closely	into	the	theoretical	
streams.	Theories	of	international	relations	arose	in	the	aftermath	of	the	First	World	War	to	provide	theoretical	
tools	for	understanding	and	analysing	international	political	phenomena	(Burchill	et	al.,	2005).	The	complexity	of	
international	 politics	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 great	 proliferation	 of	 heterogeneous	 multidisciplinary	 theoretical	
approaches	(Andreatta,	2011),	which	focus	on,	but	are	not	limited	to,	historical,	economic,	and	legal	aspects	of	
international	relations	(Jackson	&	Sørensen,	2016).	International	relations	scholars	began	to	approach	the	study	
of	the	EU	since	the	idea	of	a	“United	Europe”	arose	in	the	1950s	(Milczarek,	2013),	with	the	aim	to	theorise	about	
the	process	of	EU	integration.	Therefore,	theories	of	EU	integration	can	be	considered	a	sub-field	of	international	
relations	 theories	 (Pollack,	2001).	Neo-functionalism,	 intergovernmentalism,	 liberal	 intergovernmentalism	and	
multi-level	governance	are	generally	acknowledged	theories	of	EU	integration.	Between	the	1950s	and	1960s,	
international	relations	scholars	are	broadly	divided	between	neo-functionalists	and	intergovernmentalists.	Neo-
functionalism	is	a	theory	of	EU	integration	which	places	major	emphasis	on	the	role	of	non-state	actors,	such	as	
supranational	interest	groups	and	social	movements,	in	creating	pressure	for	EU	integration	(Haas,	1958	&	1961;	
Lindberg	&	Scheingold,	1970;	Schmitter,	2002;	Pollack,	2005).	On	the	contrary,	intergovernmentalism	claims	that	
the	 process	 of	 EU	 integration	 is	 controlled	 and	 shaped	 by	 national	 governments,	which	 voluntarily	 agree	 on	
transfer	of	legislative	power	to	EU	institutions	(Hoffman,	1966;	Pollack,	2005;	Moga,	2009).	In	the	1990s,	a	variant	
of	 intergovernmentalism,	called	 liberal	 intergovernmentalism,	becomes	popular	 (Moravcsik,	1993;	Rosamond,	
2000;	Pollack,	2005;	Moga,	2009).	Liberal	intergovernmentalism	emphasises	the	importance	of	bargaining	power	
of	 the	EU	member	states	as	driver	of	 the	process	of	EU	 integration.	Moravcsik	 (2005)	proposes	a	three-stage	
process	 of	 EU	 integration	whereby	 national	 governments	 formulate	 national	 preferences,	 then	 participate	 in	
interstate	 bargaining	 to	 negotiate	 their	 preferences	 and	 eventually	 sign	 international	 agreements	 delegating	
national	 sovereignty	 to	 EU	 institutions.	 According	 to	 liberal	 intergovernmentalists,	 state	 sovereignty	 is	 not	
weakened	by	the	EU	integration	process;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	strengthened	(Moravcsik,	1994).	This	is	because	
EU	member	states	voluntarily	delegate	to	EU	institutions	the	lowest	common	level	of	sovereignty	necessary	to	
meet	 their	 national	 interests.	 Therefore,	 supranational	 institutions	 would	 exert	 little	 influence	 over	 policy	
outcomes	as	they	are	the	result	of	interstate	bargaining	(Moravcsik,	2005;	Pollack,	2005).	Multi-level	governance	
theory	challenges	the	state-centric	approach	of	liberal	intergovernmentalism	and	claims	that	state	sovereignty	is	
diluted	in	the	EU	integration	process.	The	EU	integration	process	is	described	as	a	centrifugal	process	whereby	
authority	 is	 dispersed	 “away	 from	 central	 government,	 upwards	 to	 the	 supranational	 level,	 downwards	 to	
subnational	 jurisdictions,	 and	 sideways	 to	 public/private	 network”	 (Hooge	 &	 Marks,	 2001:	 4).	 Multi-level	
governance	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 concepts	most	widely	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 EU	 system,	 emphasising	 the	
multiplicity	of	actors	at	different	 levels	 involved	 in	EU	activities	 (Schmitter,	2002;	Buonanno	&	Nugent,	2013;	
Waele	&	Kuipers,	2013).	Nevertheless,	multi-level	governance	theory	has	not	been	stretched	over	its	descriptive	
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nature,	poorly	contributing	to	understand	how	authority	should	be	distributed	between	the	different	levels	of	
governance	(Bache,	1998;	Benz	&	Zimmer,	2010).	
The	issue	of	distribution	of	authority	between	national	and	EU	institutions	often	interrelates	with	discussions	on	
the	 effects	 of	 regulation	 on	 innovation.	 The	 relation	 between	 regulation	 and	 innovation	 is	 generally	
acknowledged	 (Prieger,	 2002;	 Bauer,	 2010;	 Blind,	 2012;	 Pelkmans	 &	 Renda,	 2014,	 Cave	 and	 Webb,	 2015).	
Extensive	research	has	been	conducted	to	identify	innovation-constraining	aspects	of	regulation	(Bailey,	1974;	
Stewart,	1981;	OECD,	1996;	Prieger,	2002;	Alesina	et	al.,	2005;	Prieger,	2008;	Stewart,	2010;	Bauer,	2010;	Ehrlich	
et	al.,	2010;	Bauer	&	Shim,	2012;	Blind,	2012;	Pelkmans	&	Renda,	2014).	Similarly,	innovation-enabling	aspects	of	
regulation	have	been	classified	(Porter	&	van	der	Linde,	1995;	Gann	et	al.,	1998;	Gerard	&	Lave,	2005;	Nentjes	et	
al.,	2007;	Ambec	et	al.,	2013;	Lane	et	al.,	2013;	Pelkmans	&	Renda,	2014).	Due	to	lack	of	a	common	understanding	
of	the	positive	or	negative	effects	of	regulation	on	innovation,	a	case-by-case	approach	is	suggested	to	design	
regulation,	 taking	 account	 of	 innovation-constraining	 and	 innovation-enabling	 regulatory	 aspects	 typical	 of	 a	
specific	sector	(Pelkmans	&	Renda,	2014).	When	designing	regulation,	a	choice	is	to	be	made	between	centralised	
and	 decentralised	 regulatory	 structures	 (Black,	 2001;	 Senn,	 2005).	 In	 the	 EU,	 such	 choice	 impacts	 on	 the	
distribution	 of	 competences	 between	 EU	 and	 national	 institutions	 (Cave	 &	 Webb,	 2015).	 In	 addition,	 the	
relevance	of	the	centralisation-decentralisation	dilemma	is	not	limited	to	the	EU	context	(Wyplosz,	2015).	On	the	
contrary,	such	policy	concern	is	critical	for	private	organisations	(Campbell	et	al.,	2011;	Deloitte,	2016);	national	
economic	systems	(Coase,	1960;	Pigou,	1920;	Bardhan,	2002;	Demsetz,	2011);	as	well	as	international	institutions	
(Koremenos	et	al.,	2001;	Leben,	2003;	Falkner,	2003).	
	
2.2.	Theoretical	concepts	
In	Paper	1,	theories	of	international	relations	have	framed	the	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	EU	in	the	international	
regulatory	 context	of	 radio	 spectrum.	 In	Paper	2,	 theories	of	EU	 integration	have	provided	 the	basic	 tools	 to	
contextualise	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	
spectrum.	Lastly,	a	review	of	existing	literature	on	the	regulation-innovation	relation	has	supported	the	discussion	
in	Paper	3	on	effects	of	a	specific	national	radio	spectrum	regulatory	tool	on	investment	and	innovation	in	the	
telecommunications	market.	
2.2.1.	Theories	of	international	relations:	agenda-setting	and	coalition	building	
Theories	 of	 international	 relations	 have	 been	 used	 to	 understand	 and	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	
international	 actor	 participating	 in	 international	 negotiations	 on	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation.	 In	 particular,	 the	
analysis	draws	on	two	main	concepts:	agenda-setting	and	coalition	building.	Theories	of	international	relations	
indicate	agenda-setting	as	a	key	determinant	of	the	outcomes	of	international	negotiations	(e.g.	Livingston,	1992;	
Modelski,	1999).	According	to	agenda-setting	theory,	agenda	setting	can	be	seen	as	a	dynamic	process	whereby	
actors	compete	against	each	other	to	earn	their	 issues	a	place	on	the	agenda	and	keep	others’	 issues	off	 the	
agenda.	Competition	arises	because	the	agenda	is	finite	in	scope	and	the	political	system	possesses	limited	means	
and	resources.	Therefore,	a	finite	number	of	issues	can	be	addressed,	among	all	possible	issues	perceived	by	the	
political	 community	 as	 requiring	 public	 intervention	 (e.g.	 Cobb	 &	 Elder,	 1972;	 Parsons,	 1995;	 Sarpu,	 2004;	
Birkland,	2006	&	2007;	Gupta,	2011;	Buonanno	&	Nugent,	2013;	Baumgartner	et	al.,	2014).	The	agenda	 thus	
includes	few	issues,	which	are	to	be	acted	upon	by	decision-makers.	Clearly,	influencing	the	process	of	agenda-
setting	is	crucial,	since	decisions	are	taken	only	on	the	issues	that	have	found	a	place	on	the	agenda.	In	addition,	
the	actors	whose	issues	gain	a	place	on	the	agenda	are	usually	more	influential	during	the	entire	policy-making	
process	 (e.g.	 Schattschneider,	 1975;	Birkland,	 2006	&	2007).	 In	order	 to	 increase	 the	power	 to	 influence	 the	
agenda,	 actors	 often	 form	 coalitions.	 A	 coalition	 is	 formed	 when	 a	 number	 of	 actors,	 who	 share	 the	 same	
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interests,	bring	together	their	means	and	resources	to	find	a	common	solution.	The	issues	that	find	support	from	
a	 large	 number	 of	 actors	 usually	 gain	 more	 visibility	 in	 the	 policy-making	 process	 (e.g.	 Birkland,	 2007;	
Baumgartner,	2010).	
2.2.2.	Theories	of	EU	integration:	shared	competence	
The	EU	possesses	a	unique	institutional	set-up	(EC,	2013;	EU,	2016a)	and	it	 is	considered	a	sui	generis	case	of	
international	 cooperation	 and	 integration	 (Wallace,	 1994;	 Andreatta,	 2011).	 Therefore,	 getting	 familiar	 with	
theories	 of	 EU	 integration	 process	 has	 been	 deemed	 crucial	 to	 understand	 the	 distinctive	 distribution	 of	
competences	between	EU	and	national	institutions	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	The	policy	field	of	radio	
spectrum	belongs	to	the	category	of	policy	areas	where	EU	and	national	institutions	share	legislative	power.	
Within	the	EU	systems,	policy	fields	can	be	distinguished	in	three	main	categories,	based	on	the	distribution	of	
competences	between	EU	and	EU	member	 states.	 The	 first	 category	 includes	policy	 areas	where	 the	EU	has	
exclusive	legislative	competence,	which	means	that	only	the	EU	institutions	can	legislate.	The	second	category	
includes	policy	areas	which	are	exclusive	domain	of	the	EU	member	states.	The	third	category	 includes	policy	
areas	 of	 shared	 competence	 between	 EU	 and	 EU	member	 states.	 Competence	 is	 shared	when	 both	 EU	 and	
national	institutions	can	legislate.	This	division	of	competences	is	grounded	in	the	principle	of	EU	law	known	as	
principle	of	conferral	(EU,	2012:	art.	5	TEU),	whereby	the	EU	can	exercise	its	legislative	power	within	the	limits	of	
the	competences	voluntarily	conferred	upon	it	by	the	EU	member	states,	by	means	of	the	so-called	EU	treaties.	
Any	policy	area	not	mentioned	in	the	EU	treaties	remains	in	the	exclusive	domain	of	the	EU	member	states	(EU,	
2012:	art.	4	TEU).	
In	policy	areas	of	shared	competence,	the	exercise	of	legislative	power	by	the	EU	institutions	is	regulated	by	two	
general	principles	of	EU	law:	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	and	the	principle	of	proportionality	(EU,	2012:	art.	5	TEU).	
These	principles	aim	to	ensure	that	decisions	are	taken	at	the	most	appropriate	level	of	government.	According	
to	the	definition	provided	in	the	TEU,	the	EU	can	take	action	only	if	and	in	so	far	as	the	objectives	of	the	proposed	
action	cannot	be	sufficiently	achieved	by	the	EU	Member	States	either	at	national	or	at	sub-national	level,	and	
can	therefore,	by	reason	of	the	scale	or	effects	of	the	proposed	action,	be	more	effectively	achieved	by	the	EU.	
The	principle	of	subsidiarity	is	closely	bound	up	with	the	principle	of	proportionality,	which	seeks	to	set	actions	
taken	by	EU	institutions	within	specified	limits.	Under	this	principle,	an	action	taken	at	EU	level	is	required	to	be	
commensurate	with	the	objectives	set	in	the	EU	treaties.	The	creation	and	implementation	of	EU	law	inevitably	
restricts	national	sovereignty.	As	set	forth	in	the	principle	of	supremacy	of	EU	law	(EU,	2012:	Declaration	No.	17	
TFEU),	the	EU	law	supersedes	the	legal	order	of	the	EU	member	states,	including	their	national	constitutions.		
2.2.3.	Theories	on	the	regulation-innovation	relation:	dynamic	efficiency	
Existing	 research	on	 the	 regulation-innovation	 relation	has	guided	 the	assessment	of	a	 specific	national	 radio	
spectrum	regulatory	 tool	 in	 terms	of	 its	capacity	 to	 foster	 investment	and	 innovation	 in	advanced	broadband	
networks	and	services.	Discussions	on	 the	 regulation-innovation	relation	 includes	 reflections	on	 the	notion	of	
dynamic	 efficiency.	 The	 relation	 between	 regulation	 and	 dynamic	 efficiency	 is	 generally	 acknowledged	 (e.g.	
Bourreau	&	Doğan,	2001;	Bauer,	2002;	Quigley,	2004;	Bijl	&	Peitz,	2004;	Prieger,	2007;	Bauer	&	Bohlin,	2008;	
Prieger,	 2008;	 Bauer	 &	 Shim,	 2012;	 Blind,	 2012;	 Yang	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Pelkmans	 &	 Renda,	 2014).	 Furthermore,	
dynamic	efficiency	has	been	recognised,	by	several	scholars,	as	a	main	contributor	to	social	welfare	(Bourreau	&	
Doğan,	2001;	Blaug,	2001,	Kathuria;	2015).	There	is	no	clear	definition	of	dynamic	efficiency	as	radio	spectrum	
regulatory	principle.	Nevertheless,	the	claim	can	be	made	that	dynamic	efficiency	occurs	when	the	radio	spectrum	
is	 regulated	 and	used	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 investment	 and	 innovation	 in	 technologies,	 services,	 allocation	 and	
assignment	procedures	are	constantly	promoted	(Cave,	2002;	Cave	et	al,	2007;	Bauer	&	Bohlin,	2008).	
	
	
	
	
 
	
	
16	
Promoting	investment	and	innovation	in	the	telecommunications	sector	has	become	one	of	the	main	public	policy	
priority	of	 the	EU	 (COM(2015),	192;	COM(2016)	590).	A	growing	 telecommunications	sector	not	only	directly	
generates	economic	and	social	growth,	but	also	indirectly	contributes	to	the	development	of	other	industries,	
such	as	transport,	health,	manufacturing,	logistics,	energy,	media	and	entertainment	(Bauer,	2010;	Bauer	&	Shim,	
2012;	Yang	et	al.,	2013;	5G	manifesto,	2016;	COM(2016)	588).	 In	particular,	policies	that	spur	investment	and	
innovation	in	advanced	broadband	networks	and	services	could	foster	economic	and	social	development	(OECD,	
1996;	Bourreau	&	Doğan,	2001;	Alesina	et	al.,	2005;	Bauer	&	Shim,	2012).	In	this	context,	it	is	to	be	placed	the	
relevance	of	assessing	whether	new	national	regulatory	tools	of	radio	spectrum	enable	dynamic	efficiency	in	the	
deployment	of	next	generation	of	network	technologies.	
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3.	Research	Strategy	
This	section	describes	the	research	strategy	adopted	during	the	whole	research	process.	The	research	strategy	
has	been	 the	outcome	of	well-grounded	decisions	on	 the	analytical	 tools	 to	 approach	 the	 research	problem.	
Decisions	have	been	guided	by	the	ambition	to	find	the	appropriate	key	for	understanding	and	interpreting	the	
research	problem.	In	summary,	a	qualitative	research	strategy	was	adopted.	Furthermore,	the	relation	between	
theory	 and	 empirical	 data	 was	 characterised	 by	 an	 iterative	 inductive-deductive	 process,	 whereby	 purpose,	
theoretical	 framework	and	data	collected	have	progressively	and	mutually	 shaped	one	another.	The	 research	
work	was	based	on	secondary	data,	retrieved	from	official	documents,	reports,	news	articles,	academic	papers	
and	 books.	 The	 section	 concludes	 by	 pointing	 out	 methodological	 limitations	 and	 opportunities	 for	
improvements.	
	
3.1.	Qualitative	research	
The	research	work	described	in	this	thesis	was	conducted	by	adopting	a	qualitative	research	strategy.	Qualitative	
research	 strategy	 is	 generally	 applied	 to	 study	 social	 phenomena	 that	 cannot	 be	 analysed	 and	 understood	
according	 to	 the	model	 of	 objectively	defined	 cause-effect	 relations,	 typical	 of	 quantitative	 research	 strategy	
(Croom,	 2009;	 Flick,	 2009).	 In	 qualitative	 research,	 the	 researcher	 does	 not	 manipulate	 aspects	 of	 the	
phenomenon	 under	 investigation,	 whereby	 hypotheses,	 extracted	 from	 theory,	 are	 tested.	 Rather,	 social	
phenomena	are	studied	as	they	unfold,	in	their	complex	entirety	(Patton,	2002;	Golafshani,	2003).	The	overall	
aim	is	to	achieve	local	and	specific	knowledge.	Furthermore,	the	researcher’s	subjectivity	is	part	of	the	research	
investigation,	 the	 research	 outcome	 being	 dependent	 upon	 the	 judgement	 of	 the	 researcher	 (Patton,	 2002;	
Golafshani,	2003).	
The	quality	of	qualitative	research	investigation	is	generally	assessed	by	using	the	trustworthiness	criterion,	which	
is	characterised	by	four	main	dimensions,	as	shown	in	Table	4	(Lincoln	&	Guba,	1985;	Bryman	&	Bell,	2011).	
Table	4.	Quality	assessment	for	quality	research:	trustworthiness	criteria	
Trustworthiness	
Credibility	
Transferability	
Dependability	
Confirmability	
Source:	Bryman	&	Bell	(2011)	
Credibility	 refers	 to	 the	 soundness	 and	 integrity	 of	 the	 research	 findings.	 If	 the	 research	 findings	 represent	
truthfully	the	reality,	they	are	defensible	(Golafshani,	2003;	Bryman	&	Bell,	2011).	Triangulation	is	a	technique	
usually	 employed	 to	 strengthen	 the	 credibility	 of	 qualitative	 research	 findings	 (Denzin,	 1978;	 Patton,	 2002;	
Bryman	&	Bell,	 2011).	 In	 this	 regard,	 theory	 triangulation	was	 used	 in	 this	 research	work,	 adopting	 different	
theoretical	perspectives	 to	examine	and	 interpret	 the	data.	Furthermore,	data	 triangulation	was	employed	to	
guarantee	the	accuracy	of	the	data	collected.	In	this	case,	data	triangulation	has	consisted	in	gathering	the	same	
information	from	different	sources,	such	as	official	documents	from	various	EU	and	national	institutions,	news	
articles,	and	reports	from	diverse	stakeholders.	
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Transferability	consists	on	producing	findings	which	can	be	transferred	to	other	contexts.	A	traditional	way	to	
enhance	transferability	is	carefully	describing	the	research	context.	In	this	regard,	this	thesis	offers	an	accurate	
description	 of	 the	 research	 context.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 may	 offer	 useful	 insights	 for	
understanding	broader	EU	issues,	which	go	beyond	the	policy	area	of	radio	spectrum,	such	as	the	EU	participation	
in	international	organisations	and	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states.	
Dependability	 corresponds	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 reliability	 used	 in	 quantitative	 research	 according	 to	 which	 an	
experiment	 is	 reliable	when	 leads	 to	 the	same	results,	 if	 conducted	 several	 times.	Dependability	 requires	 the	
researcher	 to	 carefully	document	 step	by	 step	 the	 research	 investigation	and	 related	outcomes.	A	 technique	
widely	used	to	assess	dependability	is	to	undergo	an	external	audit,	whereby	the	research	process	and	outcome	
of	 a	 study	 are	 examined	by	 a	 third	 party.	 The	 strategy	 adopted	 to	make	 the	 present	work	 dependable	 have	
included	the	participation	in	several	workshops,	training	seminars	and	conferences	where	different	parts	of	the	
research	work	have	been	presented	and	discussed	with	 individuals	not	 involved	 in	this	research	 investigation,	
including	researchers,	policy	makers	and	industry	practitioners	from	various	fields.	
Confirmability	is	concerned	with	ensuring	that	the	findings	represent	the	outcome	of	the	study	rather	than	the	
point	 of	 view,	 motivation	 or	 interest	 of	 the	 researcher.	 The	 researcher’s	 judgement	 may	 be	 influenced	 by	
cognitive	biases,	which	are	tendencies	to	reason	in	a	certain	way,	due	to	existing	knowledge	and	expectations	on	
the	process	of	collecting,	analysing	and	interpreting	data	(Bryman	&	Bell,	2011;	Halldórsson	&	Aastrup,	2003).	On	
this	 aspect,	 the	present	 thesis	 cannot	be	 considered	 free	 from	cognitive	biases.	Notwithstanding	 the	aim	 for	
rationality	 and	 good	 judgement,	 the	 research	 findings	 are	 strongly	 dependent	 of	 the	 researcher’s	 own	
understanding	of	the	research	problem.	
In	addition	to	the	trustworthiness	criterion,	a	core	concept	in	quality	of	qualitative	research	is	methodological	fit,	
which	stresses	the	importance	of	carefully	choosing	the	various	elements	of	the	research	strategy	to	make	sure	
that	they	work	together	as	a	system.	In	this	regard,	an	iterative	inductive-deductive	approach	have	been	adopted	
to	 ensure	 an	 adequate	methodological	 fit,	 whereby	 the	 various	 elements	 of	 the	 research	 design	 have	 been	
iteratively	adjusted	and	re-oriented	overtime,	based	on	new	knowledge	and	better	understanding	of	the	research	
problem,	acquired	during	the	research	investigation.	
	
3.2.	Iterative	inductive-deductive	approach		
The	research	strategy	was	characterised	by	an	iterative	inductive-deductive	approach	between	theoretical	and	
empirical	world.	As	 illustrated	in	Figure	3,	 learning	is	the	result	of	moving	back	and	forth	between	deductions	
from	theory	and	empirical	data	(Box,	1976;	Rossiter,	2011).	
	
Figure	3.	Iterative	inductive-deductive	approach	
Source:	Box	(1976)	
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By	 means	 of	 such	 iterative	 process,	 purpose,	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 empirical	 data	 are	 systematically	
adjusted	and	carefully	matched.	The	choice	for	such	iterative	process	has	not	been	taken	a	priori.	Rather,	the	
need	to	modify	purpose	and	theoretical	framework	emerged	during	the	research	process	as	a	consequence	of	
collecting	and	analysing	data.	Several	iterations	between	theory	and	empirical	data	helped	re-focus	the	overall	
purpose	 and	 refine	 the	 theoretical	 model,	 as	 well	 as	 adjust	 the	 lenses	 on	 the	 empirical	 world,	 accordingly.	
Qualitative	research	is	generally	conducted	by	setting	up	flexible	research	designs,	which	allows	for	the	different	
elements	of	the	research	design	to	be	reiteratively	adjusted	in	correspondence	to	the	knowledge	accumulated	
during	the	research	process	(Maxwell,	2013).	
	
3.3.	Document	analysis	
This	research	work	relies	on	secondary	data	sourced	from	official	documents,	reports,	news	articles,	academic	
papers	 and	 books.	 Empirical	 data	 on	 aspects	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	 have	 been	 collected	 from	 official	
documents,	reports	and	news	articles.	The	official	documents	considered	are	publicly	available	on	the	websites	
of:	 the	 ITU;	 the	 CEPT;	 the	 EC;	 the	 EP;	 the	 Council;	 the	 RSPG;	 the	 RSC;	 the	 Body	 of	 European	 Regulators	 for	
Electronic	 Communications	 (BEREC);	 and	 national	 institutions,	 such	 as	 NRAs	 and	 government	 ministries.	 In	
addition,	reports	published	by	recognised	consulting	companies	have	been	taken	into	account.	News	articles	have	
been	published	online	by	PolicyTracker,	which	 is	 a	 specialised	newsletter	 that	only	addresses	 radio	 spectrum	
policy	 issues.	 A	 wide	 range	 of	 academic	 papers	 and	 books	 have	 been	 scrutinised	 to	 build	 the	 theoretical	
framework.	Most	of	them	have	been	collected	through	Google	Scholar	and	the	Chalmers	library.	
Backward	and	forward	snowballing	techniques7	have	been	used	to	systematically	find	relevant	secondary	sources.	
Backward	snowballing	consists	of	identifying	documents	from	reference	lists,	while	forward	snowballing	consists	
of	looking	at	citations	to	documents	(Paradis	&	Zimmerman,	2002;	Jalali	&	Wohlin,	2012).	The	snowball	method	
requires	a	starting	set	of	documents,	whose	references	and	citations	can	be	looked	at.	The	starting	documents	
considered	for	this	research	work	are	seminal	work	published	by	well-known	authors	in	the	theoretical	streams	
used	to	build	the	theoretical	framework.	
One	of	the	drawbacks	of	backward	snowballing	is	that	the	search	moves	back	in	time	to	literature	that	may	be	
obsolete	 (Paradis	&	Zimmerman,	2002).	 This	drawback	 is	overcome	by	using	a	 combination	of	backward	and	
forward	snowballing.	In	fact,	forward	snowballing	moves	the	search	forward	in	time	to	more	recent	publications.	
Furthermore,	 forward	 snowballing	 facilitates	 the	 identification	 of	 relevant	 works	 which	 might	 have	 been	
published	in	unfamiliar	 journals	(Greenhalgh	&	Peacock,	2005).	This	 is	considered	particularly	relevant	for	this	
research	work	because	there	is	no	consistent	research	on	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	Therefore,	relevant	
sources	have	been	published	on	journals	and	books	of	widely	differing	kinds.	Eventually,	all	data	sources	collected	
have	been	skimmed	off	by	considering	leading	journals	and	relevant	books	for	the	research	phenomenon	under	
investigation	(Wohlin,	2014).	
	 	
																																																																		
	
7	These	techniques	are	also	referred	to	as	snowball	method	and	citation	method,	respectively.	
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With	 regard	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 documents,	 Scott	 (1990)	 proposes	 four	 criteria	 for	 evaluating	 the	 quality	 of	
secondary	sources.	These	criteria	are	indicated	in	Table	5.	
Table	5.	Criteria	for	evaluating	secondary	sources	of	data	
Quality	of	secondary	sources	
Authenticity	
Credibility	
Representativeness	
Meaning	
Source:	Scott	(1990)	
Authenticity	considers	whether	secondary	sources	are	of	unquestionable	origin	and	their	content	has	not	been	
subsequently	altered.	Credibility	refers	to	whether	the	content	of	secondary	sources,	although	genuine,	does	in	
fact	represent	truthfully	the	reality.	Representativeness	ascertains	whether	the	secondary	sources	considered	
are	representative	of	the	totality	of	the	relevant	documents,	or	whether	some	essential	documents	have	been	
left	out.	Finally,	meaning	aims	to	assess	whether	the	documents	are	comprehensible	and	clear.	
With	respect	to	the	current	research	work,	two	major	groups	of	documents	have	been	used.	Official	documents	
and	academic	papers.	Official	documents	can	generally	be	considered	authentic	as	they	are	of	dependable	origin.	
Similarly,	the	authenticity	of	academic	papers	is	guaranteed	by	selecting	only	academic	papers	published	in	well-
known	journals.	With	regard	to	credibility,	it	must	be	said	that	official	documents	are	often	the	outcome	of	public	
consultations	whereby	all	relevant	stakeholders	are	invited	to	express	their	views	on	a	topic.	The	contributions	
provided	 by	 stakeholders,	 with	 often	 competing	 interests,	 may	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 form	 of	 data	 source	
triangulation.	With	regard	to	academic	papers,	relying	on	journals	which	require	journal	articles	to	go	through	a	
peer	 review	 process	 for	 publication	 might	 guarantee	 an	 appropriate	 level	 of	 credibility.	 In	 terms	 of	
representativeness,	an	extensive	number	of	official	documents	and	academic	papers	has	been	scrutinised.	The	
process	 of	 gathering	 documents	 has	 stopped	 when	 additional	 documents	 were	 not	 providing	 any	 new	
information,	according	 to	 the	 researcher’s	own	understanding	and	 interpretation	of	 the	data.	With	 regard	 to	
meaning,	the	strategy	adopted	by	the	author	of	this	thesis	was	to	read	the	documents	several	times,	at	different	
point	in	times.	Increasing	accumulated	knowledge	about	the	research	problem	and	theoretical	framework	have	
helped	achieve	a	satisfactory	level	of	understanding	of	the	documents	considered.	
	
3.4.	Methodological	limitations	
The	 quality	 of	 the	 research	 strategy	 adopted	 could	 be	 strengthened	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways.	 In	 particular,	 the	
weakest	aspect	of	the	present	research	work	is	represented	by	the	reliance	on	documents	as	the	sole	data	source.	
One	of	the	main	problems	associated	with	using	documents	as	sources	of	data	is	accessibility.	In	fact,	necessary	
documents	might	not	be	available,	either	because	they	are	not	 retrievable	or	because	their	access	 is	blocked	
(Flick,	2009:	259).	Moreover,	document	analysis	can	be	extremely	time-consuming,	because	of	the	vastness	and	
the	amount	of	details.	Lack	of	accessibility	and	time-constraints	might	undermine	the	ability	of	the	researcher	to	
identify	all	relevant	documents	and	collect	all	important	data	(Bryman	&	Bell,	2011:	550).	Another	critical	issue	is	
related	to	the	fact	that,	using	documents	as	the	sole	sources	of	data	is	often	seen	as	a	complementary	rather	
than	a	stand-alone	method	(Bryman	&	Bell,	2011:	550).	In	this	regard,	the	credibility	of	the	research	findings	could	
be	increased	by	using	primary	sources	of	data,	such	as	first-hand	observation,	in	addition	to	documents,	in	order	
to	perform	data	triangulation.	Furthermore,	the	dependability	dimension	of	trustworthiness	would	be	enhanced	
by	publishing	the	appended	papers	to	peer-reviewed	journals.	 	
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4.	Summary	of	appended	papers	
This	 section	 summaries	 the	 appended	 papers	 included	 in	 the	 thesis	 and	 outlines	 theoretical	 and	 practical	
contributions	of	each	paper	to	the	overall	purpose.	
	
4.1.	Paper	1	
Massaro,	M.	(2017),	Declining	effectiveness	of	the	European	Union	in	the	International	Telecommunication	Union:	
evidence	from	recent	World	Radiocommunication	Conferences.	
This	paper	won	the	2017	Yale	M.	Braunstein	Student	Prize	Award	of	the	Pacific	Telecommunications	Council	(PTC)	
and	was	presented	at	the	2017	PTC	Annual	Conference,	Honolulu,	Hawaii,	USA,	15-18	January	2017.	
Summary.	Notwithstanding	an	increasing	EU	commitment	to	represent	EU	interests	at	international	level,	very	
little	is	known	about	the	EU’s	participation	in	WRCs.	In	this	respect,	a	document	analysis	was	conducted	in	Paper	
1	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	the	EU	in	influencing	the	outcomes	of	the	three	most	recent	WRCs,	held	in	2007,	
2012	and	2015.	More	 than	one	hundred	documents	were	scrutinised,	 including	official	documents,	academic	
papers,	news	articles	and	reports.	Effectiveness	was	intended	as	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	achieve	its	objectives	in	
specific	multilateral	settings	(Jørgensen	et	al.,	2011;	Wessel,	2011;	Schaik,	2013).	To	assess	the	effectiveness	of	
the	EU,	a	comparison	was	made	between	EU’s	objectives	set	prior	to	WRCs	and	WRCs’	outcomes.	The	degree	of	
match	between	EU’s	objectives	and	WRCs’	outcomes	was	taken	as	explanatory	of	the	EU’s	capability	to	fulfil	its	
objectives	through	international	negotiations.	The	motivation	of	this	study	draws	upon	existing	research	which	
ascertains	 the	EU’s	declining	 leading	 role	 in	WRCs	 (El-Moghazi	et	al.,	2014	&	2016).	Theories	of	 international	
relations,	 in	 particular	 the	 concepts	 of	 agenda-setting	 and	 coalition	 building,	 constituted	 the	 conceptual	
framework	for	the	analysis.	
The	document	analysis	shows	that	the	EU	was	partially	effective	in	influencing	the	outcomes	of	the	three	WRCs	
considered.	Three	explanatory	factors	were	identified.	Firstly,	the	EU	failed	to	contain	the	pressure	exercised	by	
other	 countries	 to	earn	 their	 issues	 a	place	on	 the	agenda.	 Secondly,	 the	EU	was	not	 able	 to	 create	or	 keep	
coalitions	in	support	of	its	objectives.	Thirdly,	the	EU	role	as	global	actor	has	been	watered	down	by	a	growing	
number	of	active	participants	at	WRCs.	 In	particular,	developing	countries	are	 increasingly	 interested	 in	 radio	
spectrum	regulation,	being	mobile	broadband	services	a	key	driver	of	economic	growth.	
Paper	1	concludes	that	the	effectiveness	of	the	EU	in	WRCs	depends,	to	a	large	extent,	on	the	preparatory	work	
prior	to	WRCs.	In	this	regard,	it	is	recommended	that	the	EU	recognises	radio	spectrum	regulation	as	a	matter	of	
EU	foreign	affairs,	in	order	to	restore	its	leading	role	in	international	negotiations	on	radio	spectrum	regulations.	
In	particular,	the	EC	is	encouraged	to	promote	intra-	and	inter-regional	cooperation	prior	to	WRCs.	Firstly,	the	EC	
may	facilitate	the	dialogue	between	the	CEPT	and	the	other	regional	organisations	active	in	Region	1,	aiming	for	
one	single	regional	proposal	instead	of	four	sub-regional	proposals	to	be	discussed	at	WRCs.	Secondly,	the	EU	
may	facilitate	the	dialogue	between	the	CEPT	and	the	regional	organisations	active	in	Region	2	and	3,	aiming	for	
inter-regional	compromises	on	the	most	critical	issues	before	WRCs.	Decisions	at	WRCs	are	taken	by	consensus	
and	 ITU	member	states	are	 the	only	actors	who	have	 the	 right	 to	participate	 in	 the	decision-making	process.	
Building	coalitions	prior	to	WRCs	might	help	the	EU	promote	its	interests	at	WRCs,	since	the	larger	the	number	
of	supporters	of	the	EU’s	interest,	the	stronger	it	may	be	the	EU’s	effectiveness	at	WRCs.	
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Contribution.	 From	 a	 theoretical	 perspective,	 Paper	 1	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 EU	 as	 an	
international	actor,	broadening	 its	scope	of	analysis	 to	 include	the	role	of	 the	EU	 in	 the	 ITU.	From	a	practical	
perspective,	Paper	1	provides	a	detailed	description	of	the	EU’s	participation	in	WRCs,	articulated	in	three	levels:	
the	EU	member	states,	the	EC	and	the	CEPT.	
Main	limitation.	Paper	1	only	focuses	on	radio	regulation	for	mobile	broadband	services.	The	assessment	of	the	
EU’s	effectiveness	might	change	if	all	issues	discussed	at	WRCs	were	considered.	 	
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4.2.	Paper	2	
Massaro,	M.	&	Bohlin,	E.	(2017),	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation:	four	stages	of	development.	
A	 previous	 version	 of	 this	 paper	 was	 presented	 at	 the	 20th	 Biennial	 Conference	 of	 the	 International	
Telecommunications	 Society	 (ITS),	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 Brazil,	 30	 November-3	 December	 2014;	 and	 at	 the	 2015	
Scientific	 Seminar	 “Policy	 challenges	 in	 Digital	 Markets”	 of	 the	 Florence	 School	 of	 Regulation	 (FSR)	 -	
Communications	&	Media,	Florence,	Italy,	27-28	March	2015.	
Summary.	 Scholars	 have	 paid	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 competence	 distribution	 between	 EU	 and	
national	institutions	in	policy	areas	of	shared	competence.	However,	none	of	these	studies	focus	on	the	policy	
area	of	 radio	spectrum.	Recently,	 the	 increasing	demand	 for	access	 to	 the	 radio	spectrum	has	unveiled	 radio	
spectrum	policy	as	a	fertile	breeding	ground	for	research	investigation.	In	this	respect,	the	aim	of	Paper	2	was	to	
trace	changes	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	overtime,	since	the	beginning	of	
EU	 radio	 spectrum	 policy,	 eventually	 focusing	 on	 the	 most	 recent	 EU	 legislative	 proposals.	 Changes	 of	
competence	distribution	were	 traced	by	documenting	 the	expansion	of	EU	 radio	 spectrum	 legislation,	paying	
particular	attention	to	the	type	of	legal	instruments	adopted	by	the	EU.	All	main	EU	regulations,	directives	and	
decisions	which	 constitute	 the	 EU	 radio	 spectrum	 legislation	were	 scrutinised.	 EC	 communications	were	 also	
included	in	the	document	analysis.	
The	development	of	 EU	 radio	 spectrum	 legislation	 is	 organised	 in	 four	 stages.	 Each	 stage	was	 triggered	by	 a	
substantial	transfer	of	competence	from	national	to	EU	institutions.	This	was	shown	by	the	expansion	of	topics	
covered	by	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation	overtime,	as	well	as	the	type	of	EU	legal	instruments	adopted.	Initially,	
the	EU	body	of	 radio	 spectrum	 legislation	was	mainly	 constituted	by	directives.	 Subsequent	 revisions	of	 such	
directives	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 some	 decisions	 reinforced	 EU	 competences	 in	 the	matter	 of	 radio	 spectrum.	
However,	the	gradual	transfer	of	power	from	national	to	EU	institutions	stalled	with	the	2013	legislative	proposal	
to	adopt	a	regulation	in	order	to	reform	the	directives	that	constituted	the	existing	EU	legislative	framework	for	
radio	 spectrum.	 Regulations	 are	 the	 strongest	 EU	 legal	 instruments	 because	 they	 are	 directly	 and	 generally	
applicable.	
Probably	due	to	the	unsuccessful	2013	legislative	proposal,	in	2016,	the	EC	proposed	to	reform	existing	provisions	
on	 radio	 spectrum,	by	 adopting	 a	directive,	which	has	 a	weaker	 centralising	power	 compared	 to	 regulations.	
Furthermore,	the	2016	directive	presents	a	more	voluntary	character,	compared	to	the	2013	legislative	proposal:	
EU	member	states	are	encouraged,	but	not	 legally	forced	to	undertake	certain	actions.	At	the	same	time,	the	
2016	directive	would	strengthen	the	role	of	the	EC	by	granting	it	the	right	to	adopt	implementing	acts	in	a	wide	
variety	of	matters	related	to	radio	spectrum	assignment.	Adopting	the	2016	directive	would	lead	to	an	expansion	
of	EU	competences	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum,	although	to	a	lessened	extent	compared	to	the	2013	
proposed	regulation.	In	fact,	the	implementing	power	exercised	by	the	EC	would	be	monitored	by	the	EU	member	
states.	Therefore,	EU	member	states	might	agree	to	relinquish	national	sovereignty	with	regard	to	radio	spectrum	
assignment,	as	long	as	there	exists	an	oversight	mechanism	to	control	the	EC	implementing	power.	However,	the	
EU’s	 system	of	 delegated	 and	 implementing	 powers	 seems	 to	 suffer	 from	 critical	 downsides,	 including	 great	
complexity,	 lack	of	 transparency,	 limited	accountability	and	 lack	of	democratic	efficiency	 (Stratulat	&	Molino,	
2011;	Christiansen	&	Dobbels,	2013).	Such	problems	might	weaken	the	efficacy	of	granting	the	EC	implementing	
powers.	This	opens	doors	for	future	research.	In	particular,	studies	on	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	in	
other	 policy	 fields	 might	 bring	 useful	 insights	 for	 evaluating	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 centralisation	 and	
decentralisation	 of	 legislative	 power	 with	 regard	 to	 radio	 spectrum	 and	 of	 distribution	 of	 legislative	 power	
between	the	EU	institutions.	
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Contribution.	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	Paper	2	follows	the	tradition	of	studies	that	address	the	issue	of	
competence	distribution	in	policy	fields	of	shared	competence,	adding	the	policy	area	of	radio	spectrum,	which	
has	 been	 so	 far	 neglected	 by	 European	 studies.	 From	 a	 practical	 perspective,	 Paper	 2	 structures	 EU	 radio	
spectrum	legislation	 in	four	stages	of	development,	highlighting	the	main	changes	of	competence	distribution	
between	EU	and	EU	member	states.	
Main	limitation.	The	classification	of	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation	in	four	stages	of	development	is	arbitrary	and	
subject	to	the	personal	interpretation	of	the	authors.	 	
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4.3.	Paper	3	
Massaro,	M.	(2016),	Next	generation	of	radio	spectrum	management:	Licensed	Shared	Access	and	the	trade-off	
between	static	and	dynamic	efficiency.	
This	paper	has	been	submitted	to	Journal	of	Telecommunications	Policy,	Special	 Issue	“Optimising	Spectrum”,	
guest	editors	Martin	Cave	and	Jock	Given.	A	previous	version	of	this	paper	was	co-authored	with	Professor	Gérard	
Pogorel,	Telecoms	ParisTech,	and	Professor	Erik	Bohlin,	Chalmers	University	of	Technology,	and	presented	at	the	
26th	 European	Regional	 Conference	of	 the	 International	 Telecommunications	 Society	 (ITS),	 San	 Lorenzo	de	 El	
Escorial,	Spain,	24-27	June	2015;	and	at	the	2015	Regional	Conference	of	the	International	Telecommunications	
Society	(ITS),	Los	Angeles,	California,	USA,	27-28	October	2015.		
Summary.	One	of	the	current	EU	policy	priorities	 is	to	promote	dynamic	efficiency	 in	the	telecommunications	
sector	(EC,	2016b).	In	this	context,	the	EU	has	recently	promoted	a	new	spectrum	sharing	arrangement	called	
LSA.	LSA	is	regulatory	approach	that	allows	for	shared	use	of	already	assigned	but	underused	spectrum	bands	
between	incumbents	and	new	LSA	licensees	by	means	of	individual	spectrum	licences.	These	individual	licences	
would	include	sharing	conditions	to	allow	both	incumbents	and	new	users	to	provide	a	certain	quality	of	service	
(QoS)	(RSPG,	2015).	
Several	 studies	 have	 argued	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 spectrum	 sharing	 arrangements	 to	 promote	 dynamic	
efficiency	(Noam,	2003;	Peha,	2009;	Bunel	&	Lescop,	2012;	Khun	-Jush	et	al.,	2012;	RSPG,	2013;	Plum	Consulting,	
2013;	Werbahc	&	Mehta,	2014;	Rysavy,	2014).	Continuing	this	tradition,	the	aim	of	Paper	3	was	to	provide	a	full-
fledged	assessment	of	LSA	 in	 terms	of	 its	potential	 to	promote	dynamic	efficiency	 in	 the	telecommunications	
sectors.	 In	Paper	3,	dynamic	efficiency	was	 intended	as	the	capability	of	the	LSA	regulatory	regime	to	provide	
mobile	operators	with	incentives	to	invest	in	advanced	broadband	networks.	A	document	analysis	was	conducted	
to	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 LSA	 on	 investments	 in	 advanced	 network	 technologies.	 Policy	 documents,	 academic	
papers,	position	papers	and	reports	were	scrutinised	to	gather	information	on	technical	and	regulatory	aspects	
of	LSA,	as	well	as	the	state-of-the-art	of	the	research	on	the	regulation-innovation	relation,	with	a	focus	on	the	
trade-off	between	static	and	dynamic	efficiency.	
The	assessment	showed	that	the	LSA	regulatory	regime	could	provide	important	stimuli	for	mobile	operators	to	
invest	in	advanced	network	deployment.	However,	some	regulatory	aspects	still	need	to	be	refined,	in	particular	
with	regard	to	enforcement	mechanisms.	LSA	is	an	example	of	a	new	generation	of	radio	spectrum	regulatory	
tools	 based	 on	 spectrum	 sharing	 arrangements.	 Finding	 additional	 spectrum	 for	 mobile	 services	 is	 deemed	
necessary	and	LSA	offers	mobile	users	the	opportunity	to	access	spectrum,	in	a	timely	manner,	while	avoiding	the	
costs	related	to	participating	in	authorisation	procedures.	Similarly,	incumbents	would	avoid	lengthy	and	costly	
re-allocation	processes,	and	receive	monetary	or	other	forms	of	benefits	from	LSA	licensees,	while	maintaining	
control	over	the	spectrum	in	the	long-term.	Nevertheless,	LSA	does	not	provide	the	regulatory	certainty	necessary	
for	stepping	forward	from	LSA	testing	to	actual	implementation.	In	particular,	the	benefits	of	implementing	LSA	
would	be	lessened	without	the	development	of	proper	enforcement	mechanisms,	which	are	fundamental	for	LSA	
to	promote	investment	and	innovation.	Enforcement	mechanisms	are	necessary	to	ensure	that	incumbents	and	
LSA	 licensees	comply	with	agreed	frequency,	 location	and	time	sharing	conditions,	by	providing	 incentives	for	
compliance	 and/or	 punishments	 for	 non-compliance.	 Furthermore,	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 to	 safeguard	
privacy	and	security	of	sensitive	 information	regarding	spectrum	usage	of	both	 incumbents	and	LSA	 licensees	
should	be	put	in	place.	
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Contribution.	From	a	theoretical	perspective,	Paper	3	attempts	to	dig	into	the	theoretical	discussion	on	the	trade-
off	between	static	and	dynamic	efficiency,	by	addressing	this	 issue	with	respect	to	radio	spectrum	regulation.	
From	 a	 practical	 perspective,	 Paper	 3	 offers	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 radio	 spectrum	 management	
practices.	Three	generations	of	radio	spectrum	management	are	identified,	highlighting	their	respective	policy	
objectives,	regulatory	approaches	and	assignment	procedures.	
Main	limitation.	The	identification	of	three	generations	of	radio	spectrum	management	is	arbitrary	and	subject	
to	the	personal	interpretation	of	the	author.	Similarly,	the	assessment	of	the	LSA	regulatory	regime	with	respect	
to	dynamic	efficiency	 is	conditional	 to	 the	author’s	own	understanding	of	 the	concepts	of	static	and	dynamic	
efficiency.	 	
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5.	Analysis	and	Discussion	
This	section	builds	on	the	analysis	conducted	in	the	three	appended	papers	and	provides	an	exhaustive	answer	
to	the	main	research	question:	how	does	the	EU	influence	the	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum?	
To	this	aim,	the	contributions	of	the	appended	papers	to	the	overall	research	question	are	integrated	and	further	
discussed.	
The	EU	legislative	framework	for	radio	spectrum	lies	across	the	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum,	
adding	on	and,	to	some	extent,	overlapping	with	international,	regional	and	national	regulatory	levels.	The	role	
of	the	EU	in	regulating	the	radio	spectrum	has	to	be	placed	in	a	context	where	countries	own	the	power	to	decide	
on	 both	 radio	 spectrum	 allocation	 and	 assignment.	 Countries	 take	 decisions	 on	 radio	 spectrum	 allocation	 at	
international	level,	periodically	participating	in	WRCs,	and	regionally	coordinate	during	the	preparatory	work	prior	
to	WRCs.	Furthermore,	NRAs	are	in	charge	of	radio	spectrum	assignment,	granting	radio	spectrum	licences	for	
the	 provision	 of	 radio-based	 services	 at	 national	 level.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 EU	 radio	 spectrum	 policy	 and	 its	
regulatory	framework	do	exert	influence	on	both	radio	spectrum	allocation	and	assignment.	
The	EU	is	a	sui	generis	international	actor.	The	EU	does	not	own	any	decisional	power	at	WRCs.	Only	ITU	member	
states	 have	 the	 right	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 WRC	 decision-making	 process	 for	 radio	 spectrum	 allocation.	
Nevertheless,	the	EU	does	contribute	to	shape	WRC	decisions.	In	particular,	the	EC,	on	behalf	of	the	EU,	attends	
WRCs	 as	 observer,	 supervising	 the	 actions	 of	 EU	 member	 states.	 Although	 without	 formal	 seat	 and	 vote,	
participating	 in	WRCs	 gives	 the	 EC	 the	 possibility	 to	 encourage	 EU	member	 states	 to	 collectively	 support	 EU	
interests	(e.g.	Shahin,	2011;	COM(2015)	234).	
The	EU	does	not	belong	to	the	category	of	regional	organisations	active	in	the	three	ITU	Regions,	which	promote	
cross-country	coordination	of	radio	spectrum	use	and	formulate	regional	proposals	for	modifications	of	the	RR.	
Nevertheless,	the	EU	undertakes	a	similar	function,	promoting	harmonised	allocation	of	radio	spectrum	across	
the	EU.	In	order	to	promote	harmonisation,	the	EC	works	intensively	to	build	consensus	among	EU	member	states	
during	the	preparatory	work	to	WRCs.	In	particular,	the	EC	adopts	the	so-called	common	EU	position	in	order	to	
inform	national	governments	about	EU	 interests	 in	 the	matter	of	 radio	spectrum	allocation.	The	common	EU	
position	takes	the	form	of	a	Communication	to	the	Council	 (as	well	as	to	the	EP,	the	European	Economic	and	
Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	the	Regions).	Members	of	the	Council	are	national	government	ministers.	
The	Council	(together	with	the	EP)	is	required	to	endorse	the	common	EU	position	by	adopting	a	decision	with	
binding	effects	on	all	the	EU	member	states.8	In	addition,	the	EC	formulates	the	common	EU	position,	taking	into	
consideration	the	opinion	expressed	by	 the	RSPG.	Members	of	 the	RSPG	are	high-level	governmental	experts	
from	 EU	 member	 states	 and	 a	 high-level	 representative	 from	 the	 EC	 (Decision	 2009/978/EU).	 Cooperation	
between	the	EC	and	the	RSPG	allows	the	EU	member	states	to	contribute	to	and	shape	the	common	EU	position.	
Furthermore,	the	EC	collaborates	with	the	CEPT,	during	the	preparatory	work	prior	to	WRCs,	providing	support	
for	 developing	 and	 adopting	 ECPs	 (CEPT,	 2009).	 Although	 the	 CEPT	 has	 a	 broader	 scope	 than	 the	 EU,	 ECPs	
facilitate	convergence	of	national	interests	into	a	common	position	on	radio	spectrum	allocation.	Furthermore,	it	
is	worth	mentioning	that	the	EU	member	states’	participation	in	WRCs	is	bounded	by	the	TEU	and	TFEU,	as	well	
as	the	EU	legislative	framework	for	electronic	communications,	which	incorporates	the	body	of	EU	radio	spectrum	
legislation.	
																																																																		
	
8	Interestingly,	the	Council	adopted	Council	Conclusions	in	preparation	for	the	WRC	held	in	2015.	Council	Conclusions	are	not	legally	binding	on	the	EU	
member	states.	According	to	the	EC,	the	Council	acted	in	breach	of	the	art.	218	of	the	TFEU	(Council	of	the	EU,	2015).	
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Since	the	1980s,	the	body	of	EU	 law	 in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum	has	gradually	expanded,	 in	terms	of	
number	and	types	of	 legal	 instruments	adopted	and	range	of	topics	covered,	generating	a	gradual	transfer	of	
competence	from	national	to	EU	institutions.	Scattered	legal	interventions	marked	the	beginning	of	the	EU	body	
of	law	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	A	number	of	directives	were	adopted	in	order	to	promote	harmonised	
allocation	of	selected	radio	spectrum	bands	for	mobile	communications.	EU	radio	spectrum	legislation	started	to	
develop	in	a	systematic	manner	since	the	implementation	of	the	revised	2002	legislative	framework	for	electronic	
communications.	The	directives	 forming	 the	2002	 legislative	package	aimed	at	 removing	differences	between	
national	 systems	 by	 introducing	 general	 regulatory	 principles	 such	 as	 objectivity,	 transparency,	 equality,	 and	
proportionality	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 both	 allocation	 and	 assignment	 of	 radio	 spectrum,	 and	 by	 simplifying	
authorisation	rules	for	granting	radio	spectrum	licences.	A	decisive	moment	in	the	evolution	of	EU	radio	spectrum	
legislation	was	the	adoption	of	the	2002	Radio	Spectrum	Decision	(Decision	676/2002/EC),	which	institutionalised	
the	role	of	the	EU	in	radio	spectrum	policy	by	introducing	the	existing	comitology	mechanism	whereby	the	EC	is	
supported	by	RSPG	and	RSC	in	setting	up	EU	radio	spectrum	policy.	Contrary	to	directives,	decisions	are	directly	
applicable	and	immediately	affect	national	legal	systems.	The	second	review	of	the	EU	legislative	framework	for	
electronic	 communications	 further	 strengthened	 EU	 competence	 in	 the	 policy	 field	 of	 radio	 spectrum.	 In	
particular,	the	2009	Better	Regulation	Directive	(Directive	2009/140/EC)	encouraged	the	set-up	of	the	first	tailor-
made	 legislative	 initiative	on	radio	spectrum.	The	first	Radio	Spectrum	Policy	Programme	(RSPP)	was	adopted	
with	 Decision	 243/2012/EU.	 The	measures	 included	 in	 the	 RSPP	 aimed	 at	 harmonising	 both	 radio	 spectrum	
allocation	and	assignment,	setting	up,	among	other	things,	a	deadline	for	allocation	and	assignment	of	certain	
radio	spectrum	frequencies	for	mobile	broadband	services	across	the	EU.	The	gradual	transfer	of	legislative	power	
from	national	to	EU	institutions	has	come	to	a	halt	with	the	unsuccessful	2013	legislative	proposal	to	reform	the	
2009	 legislative	 framework	 (COM(2013)	 627).	 The	 2013	 legislative	 proposal	 took	 the	 form	 of	 a	 regulation.	
Regulations	possess	the	strongest	centralising	power	as	they	are	directly	and	generally	applicable	throughout	the	
EU.	The	proposed	reforms	would	have	determined	a	substantial	transfer	of	power	to	the	EC	to	supervise	many	
aspects	of	radio	spectrum	assignment	procedures,	conditions	of	use	attached	to	radio	spectrum	rights	of	use	as	
well	as	timetables,	for	the	coordinated	availability	of	radio	spectrum	and	harmonised	conditions	of	use,	across	
the	EU.	EU	member	states	considered	these	reforms	to	be	unreasonably	intrusive	of	national	sovereignty.	A	new	
legislative	proposal	was	put	forward	in	2016	(COM(2016)	590).	In	the	light	of	the	2013	failed	attempt	to	reform	
the	 2009	 legislative	 framework	 by	 implementing	 a	 regulation,	 the	 2016	 legislative	 proposal	 includes	 radio	
spectrum	 reforms	 in	 a	 directive.	 Furthermore,	 the	 provisions	 included	 in	 the	 2016	 directive	 present	 a	more	
voluntary	character,	recommending	rather	than	forcing	the	EU	member	states	to	manage	the	radio	spectrum	in	
a	certain	manner.	At	the	same	time,	more	responsibilities	are	attributed	to	the	EC,	which	would	be	granted	the	
power	to	adopt	implementing	acts	in	a	relatively	wide	range	of	matters	related	to	radio	spectrum	assignment.	
Implementing	acts	are	adopted	to	ensure	uniform	implementation	of	EU	legislation	at	national	level.	The	2016	
legislative	proposal	has	been	submitted	to	the	EP	and	the	EC,	which	will	decide	upon	adoption,	amendment,	or	
rejection	of	the	proposed	reforms	(EU,	2012:	art.	289	TFEU).	
As	matter	stands,	the	EU’s	influence	on	the	national	regulatory	level	of	radio	spectrum	is	rather	limited.	Radio	
spectrum	rights	of	use	are	granted	at	national	level	by	NRAs.	Currently,	radio	spectrum	rights	of	use	are	generally	
assigned	by	means	of	auctions.	NRAs	are	responsible	for	choosing	auction	formats	and	setting	reserve	prices	and	
timetables.	 Furthermore,	 NRAs	 usually	 include	 regulatory	 remedies	 in	 the	 auction	 design,	 such	 as	 coverage	
obligations	and	competitive	measures.	Coverage	obligations	are	set	to	achieve	certain	national	policy	objectives,	
such	as	broadband	coverage	in	underserved	areas.	Competitive	measures,	such	as	spectrum	caps	and	set-aside	
spectrum,	 are	 often	 introduced	 to	 protect	 or	 promote	 competition	 in	 the	 national	 downstream	 market.	
Notwithstanding	lack	of	legislative	power	with	regard	to	assignment	procedures,	the	EU	may	indirectly	influence	
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the	national	regulatory	level	of	radio	spectrum	by	providing	EU	member	states	with	ideas	on	innovative	regulatory	
tools.	Recently,	 the	EU	has	shown	an	 increasing	 interest	 in	the	LSA	regulatory	regime,	 to	meet	the	 increasing	
demand	 for	 access	 to	 the	 radio	 spectrum,	 in	particular	 for	mobile	broadband	 services.	 LSA	has	 attracted	 the	
attention	of	several	EU	member	states,	which	sought	the	possibility	to	open	public	sector	spectrum	for	mobile	
broadband	services.	Although	LSA	was	initially	proposed	by	an	industry	consortium	composed	by	Qualcomm	and	
Nokia,	the	EU’s	promotion	of	such	spectrum	sharing	arrangement	may	have	contributed	to	its	acknowledgement	
at	national	level.		
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6.	Concluding	Remarks	
This	section	concludes	the	cover	paper	by	providing	a	summary	of	the	research	work	and	outlining	opportunities	
for	future	research.	The	reader	 is	encouraged	to	consider	this	thesis	as	a	starting	point	which	hints	to	several	
research	paths	to	be	further	explored	in	the	future.	
	
6.1.	Summary	
This	research	work	was	conducted	to	grasp	the	implications	of	the	EU	regulatory	framework	for	radio	spectrum.	
This	 thesis	 has	 been	 structured	 around	 a	main	 research	 question:	how	does	 the	 EU	 influence	 the	 three-level	
regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum?	In	order	to	answer	this	research	question,	the	research	work	was	conceived	
to	 explore	 the	 international,	 regional	 and	 national	 regulatory	 levels	 of	 radio	 spectrum,	 devoting	 effort	 to	
ascertaining	the	influence	of	the	EU	legislative	framework	for	radio	spectrum	on	each	regulatory	level.	Although	
the	 implications	 of	 the	 EU	 legislative	 framework	 on	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	 are	 not	 captured	 thoroughly,	
interesting	conclusions	can	be	drawn	from	this	thesis.	Overall,	the	EU	legislative	framework	for	radio	spectrum	
lies	across	the	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum,	adding	on	and,	to	some	extent,	overlapping	with	
international,	regional	and	national	regulatory	levels.	
Firstly,	the	EU	influences	the	international	level	of	radio	spectrum	regulation	by	means	of	the	EC’s	participation	
in	WRCs.	Although	the	EC	does	not	own	any	decisional	power,	its	role	as	observer	at	WRCs	might	create	pressure	
on	the	EU	member	states	to	support	EU	interests	during	the	negotiations.	Secondly,	the	EU	pursues	the	same	
general	objective	of	the	CEPT	and	the	other	regional	entities:	promotion	of	cross-country	coordination	of	radio	
spectrum	use	in	a	certain	regional	area.	In	this	regard,	the	EU	impacts	on	the	regional	regulatory	context	of	radio	
spectrum	by	promoting	harmonised	availability	of	radio	spectrum	across	the	EU.	To	this	objective,	the	EU	adopts	
policy	instruments	which	are	legally	binding	for	all	EU	member	states.	Furthermore,	the	EC	cooperates	with	the	
CEPT	in	order	to	build	consensus	across	the	EU.	Thirdly,	the	EU’s	influence	on	the	national	level	of	radio	spectrum	
regulation	is	confined	to	general	regulatory	principles	that	all	NRAs	are	required	to	comply	with	when	designing	
and	conducting	radio	spectrum	assignment	procedures.	However,	NRAs	are	the	sole	entities	in	charge	of	choosing	
assignment	 procedures	 and	 setting	 up	 conditions	 of	 use	 of	 the	 radio	 spectrum	 in	 their	 national	 territories.	
Nevertheless,	the	EU	may	still	leverage	on	the	national	regulatory	level	of	radio	spectrum.	In	particular,	the	EU	
can	provide	EU	member	states	with	ideas	on	alternative	ways	to	assign	and	use	the	radio	spectrum	at	national	
level.	The	EU	may	be	seen	as	a	catalyst	for	regulatory	experimentation,	EU	member	states	capturing	knowledge	
on	otherwise	unseen	regulatory	opportunities,	promoted	by	the	EU.	
A	qualitative	research	strategy	was	adopted	to	explore	the	research	problem	at	hand,	whereby	the	researcher’s	
subjectivity	has	played	a	key	role.	Furthermore,	the	different	elements	of	the	research	design	have	been	gradually	
adjusted	and	matched	thanks	to	several	iterations	between	the	conceptual	framework	and	the	empirical	data.	
This	research	work	was	primarily	based	on	archival	data	retrieved	from	official	documents	produced	by	national,	
regional	and	international	organisations,	as	well	as,	reports,	news	articles,	academic	papers	and	books.	
The	relevance	of	this	research	work	stands	out	from	the	current	need	to	find	additional	radio	spectrum	for	mobile	
broadband	services.	The	increasing	demand	for	access	to	the	radio	spectrum	has	unveiled	the	impossibility	of	the	
existing	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 radio	 spectrum	 to	 accommodate	 emerging	 spectrum	 needs.	 Creating	 a	
regulatory	environment	which	would	promote	investment	and	innovation	in	the	telecommunications	sector	has	
become	one	of	the	main	public	policy	priorities	worldwide.	Currently,	the	radio	spectrum	is	 in	the	limelight	of	
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policy	makers	and	industry	practitioners	engaged	in	the	global	race	for	deployment	of	5G	networks	and	provision	
of	the	next	generation	mobile	services.		
The	novelty	of	this	thesis	lies	on	the	choice	to	set	the	scope	of	investigation	on	the	EU	context.	To	the	knowledge	
of	 the	 author,	 the	 role	of	 the	 EU	 in	 radio	 spectrum	 regulation	has	 so	 far	 been	neglected	by	political	 science	
research.	 In	 this	 regard,	 this	 thesis	 offers	 a	 preliminary	 attempt	 to	 theorise	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 as	 an	
international	 actor	 and	 about	 the	 issue	 of	 competence	 distribution	 between	 EU	 and	 national	 levels	 of	
government,	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	Nevertheless,	this	thesis	in	not	without	limitations.	The	reader	
is	encouraged	to	 look	at	these	 limitations	not	as	fallacies	of	the	present	work,	but	as	opportunities	for	 future	
research.	Such	opportunities	are	outlined	in	the	following	paragraph.	
	
6.2.	Opportunities	for	future	research	
This	 research	work	may	have	raised	more	questions	 than	 it	has	answered.	Nevertheless,	 the	hope	 it	 that	 the	
reader’s	 expectations	 have	 been	 fairly	met.	 An	 additional	 hope	 is	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 radio	 spectrum	
regulation	will	be	more	systematically	studied	in	the	future.	In	this	regard,	some	opportunities	for	future	research	
are	pinpointed	in	this	paragraph,	to	deepen	the	analysis	of	the	EU’s	influence	on	the	three-level	regulatory	context	
of	radio	spectrum.	
The	EU	participation	 in	 the	 ITU	still	needs	 to	be	 thoroughly	assessed.	Although	 this	 thesis	 claims	 that	 the	EU	
influences	the	WRC	decision-making	process,	a	sound	justification	of	such	claim	is	lacking.	In	other	words,	this	
thesis	fails	to	measure	the	magnitude	of	the	EU’s	influence	and,	consequently,	the	significance	of	the	EU	as	an	
international	actor.	In	this	regard,	a	more	systematic	evaluation	of	the	EU’s	actorness	(Bretherton	&	Vogler,	2006)	
is	to	be	conducted	in	order	to	capture	the	relevance	of	the	EU’s	influence	for	the	international	regulatory	level	of	
radio	 spectrum.	 EU	 actorness	 can	 be	 intended	 as	 the	 capability	 of	 the	 EU	 to	 act	 in	 international	 settings	
(Bretherton	&	Vogler,	2006)	actively	and	deliberately	participating	in	multilateral	negotiations	with	other	actors	
(Greiçevci,	2011).	Literature	on	EU	actorness	in	international	institutions	may	offer	the	necessary	theoretical	tools	
whereby	measure	the	external	influence	exercised	by	the	EU.	For	instance,	Bretherton	&	Vogler	(2006)	elaborate	
on	 three	 indicators	 for	 identifying	 EU	 actorness	 in	 international	 relations.	 These	 indicators	 are:	 opportunity,	
presence	 and	 capability.	 Opportunity	 refers	 to	 factors	 in	 the	 external	 environment,	 which	 might	 enable	 or	
constrain	 the	EU’s	ability	 to	 take	action;	presence	 refers	 to	 the	 influence	 that	 the	EU	might	exert	as	a	direct	
consequence	of	its	existence;	while	capability	refers	to	factors	internal	to	the	EU	context,	which	might	enable	or	
constrain	the	EU’s	ability	to	take	action.	According	to	Bretherton	&	Vogler	(2006),	combinations	of	exogenous	
opportunities	and	endogenous	resources	determine	EU	actorness,	i.e.	the	EU	ability	of	act	at	international	level.	
Similarly,	the	model	proposed	by	Jupille	&	Caporaso	(1998)	includes	four	dimensions	of	EU	external	actorness:	
cohesion,	authority,	autonomy	and	recognition;	upon	which	Groenleer	&	Schaik	(2007)	add	considerations	about	
informal	practices	which	might	influence	the	capability	of	the	EU	to	exert	 its	 influence.	Cohesion	refers	to	the	
capability	of	the	EU	to	formulate	its	own	preferences;	authority	refers	to	whether	the	EU	has	the	competence	to	
act	in	a	certain	policy	area;	autonomy	indicates	the	existence	of	the	EU	as	an	actor	on	its	own	right,	separate	from	
the	EU	member	states;	recognition	is	about	the	acceptance	of	the	EU’s	role	as	an	international	actor	by	the	other	
actors	active	in	the	international	arena.	In	addition	to	this	theory-guided	investigation,	further	empirical	research	
is	 needed	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 capability	 of	 the	 EU	 to	 actively	 and	 deliberately	 participate	 in	 international	
negotiations	(Groenleer	&	Schaik,	2007).	In	this	regard,	greater	awareness	of	the	EU	participation	in	the	ITU	might	
be	gained	by	assessing	the	phenomenon	of	EU	actorness	in	different	international	contexts.	More	specifically,	a	
comparative	 study	 (Bryman	 &	 Bell,	 2011)	may	 be	 set	 up	 to	 look	 at	 the	 EU	 as	 an	 international	 actor	 in	 two	
international	organisations:	 the	 ITU	and	 the	Universal	Postal	Union	 (UPU).	 ITU	and	UPU	present	a	number	of	
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similarities	which	would	 guarantee	 a	 consistent	 comparison	 (Flick,	 2009;	 Bryman	&	 Bell,	 2011).	 In	 fact,	 both	
organisations	 are	 UN	 specialised	 agencies	 where	 the	 EU	 is	 granted	 observer	 status.	 Both	 ITU	 and	 UPU	 are	
responsible	 for	 periodically	 reviewing	 and	 revising	 international	 regulations	 for	 radio	 spectrum	 and	 postal	
services,	respectively.	In	addition,	both	radio	spectrum	policy	and	postal	policy	are	relevant	with	respect	to	the	
EU’s	overall	policy	objective	to	complete	the	EU	internal	market	(Directive	2008/6/EC).	
Similarly,	a	comparative	study	could	be	built	to	better	understand	whether	and	to	what	extent	the	EU	influences	
the	regional	regulatory	level	of	radio	spectrum.	In	fact,	the	EU	interacts	with	both	European	organisations	active	
in	 the	 respective	 telecommunications	and	postal	 sectors,	 such	as	 the	CEPT	and	 the	European	Committee	 for	
Postal	Regulation	(CERP).	Therefore,	such	comparison	may	contribute	to	assess	the	degree	of	regional	actorness	
of	the	EU.	Literature	on	EU	actorness	may	also	help	explain	the	EU	actor	capacity	on	a	regional	level	identifying	
exogenous	factors	which	may	enable	or	constrain	the	EU	ability	to	take	action	with	respect	to	the	other	regional	
organisations	active	in	the	three	ITU	regions.	In	addition,	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	
EU	member	states	is	to	be	taken	further	in	order	to	comprehensively	assess	the	role	of	the	EU	as	a	regional	actor.	
Studies	on	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	in	other	policy	fields	might	bring	useful	insights	for	evaluating	
costs	and	benefits	of	centralisation	and	decentralisation	of	legislative	power	in	the	policy	field	of	radio	spectrum.	
In	 turn,	 such	 evaluation	 would	 contribute	 to	 identify	 endogenous	 elements	 of	 the	 EU	 system	 which	 would	
promote	or	preclude	EU	regional	actorness	in	radio	spectrum	regulation.	Overall,	the	authority	dimension	of	EU	
external	actorness	depends	on	the	extent	of	legislative	competence	transferred	from	national	to	EU	institutions	
(Gehring	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Other	 elements	 of	 EU	 external	 actorness,	 such	 as	 autonomy	 and	 recognition,	may	 be	
evaluated	by	examining	 the	 issue	of	competence	distribution	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	EU	member	states.	
More	precisely,	a	multiple	case	study	could	be	set	up	to	analyse	in	detail	national	approaches	to	radio	spectrum.	
In	 turn,	 this	analysis	may	help	clarify	whether	 the	EU	 is	 recognised	as	a	 relevant	actor	 in	 its	own	 right	by	EU	
member	states	and	it	is	able	to	exercise	its	influence	on	the	national	regulatory	level	of	radio	spectrum.	
In	addition,	the	degree	of	EU	action	capability	with	respect	to	the	national	regulatory	level	may	be	better	assessed	
by	broadening	the	scope	of	the	analysis	to	include	the	perspectives	of	the	subjects	regulated,	such	as	the	mobile	
service	operators.	Their	view	on	the	issue	of	competence	distribution	between	EU	and	EU	member	states	may	
help	understand	whether	the	EU	has	actually	gained	control	or	it	is	expected	to	gain	control	over	essential	aspects	
of	 radio	 spectrum	 assignment	 or	 whether	 radio	 spectrum	 assignment	 is	 exclusively	 seen	 as	 a	 national	
responsibility.	
The	three-level	regulatory	context	of	radio	spectrum	has	been	so	far	neglected	by	political	science	research.	In	
particular,	no	systematic	 research	has	been	conducted	 to	assess	 the	 influence	 that	 the	EU	exercises	on	radio	
spectrum	regulation.	The	increasing	importance	of	radio	spectrum	use	for	the	future	of	mobile	communications	
services	has	unveiled	an	interesting	and	stimulating	field	of	research,	which	offers	a	wide	variety	of	opportunities	
to	expand	existing	knowledge,	contributing	to	the	conceptualisation	of	the	EU	as	an	actor	on	its	own	right	and	
opening	up	door	for	more	efficient	ways	to	regulate	the	radio	spectrum.	
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